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DRAFT

HOW PRIVATE INSURERS REGULATE PUBLIC POLICE
John Rappaport*
A string of deadly police-citizen encounters, made public on an
unprecedented scale, has thrust American policing into the crucible of
political conflict. New social movements have taken to the streets,
while legislators have introduced a wide array of reform proposals.
Optimism is elusive, though, as the police are notoriously difficult to
change. One powerful policy lever, however, has been overlooked:
police liability insurance. Based on primary sources new to legal
literature and interviews with nearly thirty insurance industry
representatives, civil rights litigators, municipal attorneys, and
consultants, this Article shows how liability insurers are capable of
effecting meaningful change within the agencies they insure—a
majority of police agencies nationwide.
The Article is the first to describe and assess the contemporary market
for liability insurance in the policing context; in particular, the effects
of insurance on police behavior. While not ignoring the familiar (and
potentially serious) problem of moral hazard, the Article focuses on
the ways in which insurers perform a traditionally governmental
“regulatory” role as they work to manage risk. Insurers get police
agencies to adopt or amend written departmental policies on subjects
like the use of force and strip searches, to change the way they train
their officers, and even to fire problem officers, from the beat up to the
chief. One implication of these findings is that the state might
regulate the police by regulating insurers. In this spirit, the Article
considers several unconventional legal reforms that could reduce
police misconduct, including a mandate that all municipalities
purchase insurance coverage, a ban on “first-dollar” (no-deductible)
policies that may reduce municipal care, and a requirement that
small municipalities pool their risks and resources before buying
insurance on the commercial market.
At bottom, the Article
establishes that liability insurance has profound significance to any
comprehensive program of police reform.
The Article also makes three important theoretical contributions to
legal scholarship. First, it inverts the ordinary model of governance
as public regulation of private action, observing that here, private
insurers regulate public police. Second, it illustrates how insurers not
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only enforce the Constitution, but also construct its meaning. Among
other things, in the hands of insurers, liability for constitutional
violations and other police misconduct becomes “loss” to the police
agency, which must be “controlled.”
Perhaps surprisingly, by
denaturing the law in this way and stripping it of its moral valence,
insurers may actually advance the law’s aims. Finally, the Article
helps to pry open the black box of deterrence. In fact, given
widespread indemnification of both individual and entity liability for
constitutional torts committed by police, an understanding of how
insurers manage police risk is essential to any persuasive theory of
civil deterrence of police misconduct.

INTRODUCTION
Ours is an era of populist police oversight. Footage from cell phones
and police officers’ body-worn cameras, amplified by both traditional
and social media, has offered the American people an unprecedented,
up-close look at the violence endemic to policing.1 With each story that
breaks of another unarmed citizen, usually black, dying at the hands of
the law, the public is losing faith in law enforcement.2 Thousands have
taken to the streets in protest.3 Activists have called upon every branch
and level of government to intercede, and political leaders have begun
to heed these calls.4 Municipalities have paid millions in settlements.5
1 See, e.g., Eliott C. McLaughlin, We’re Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just
More News Coverage, CNN (Apr. 21, 2015, 7:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/
20/us/police-brutality-video-social-media-attitudes/; Nick Wing, 16 Numbers That
Explain Why Police Reform Became an Even Bigger Story in 2015, HUFFPOST
POLITICS (Dec. 29, 2015), 8:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/policereform-numbers-2015_us_5672e150e4b0688701dc7a54; see also Jocelyn Simonson,
Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571470.
2 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years,
GALLUP (June 19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-policelowest-years.aspx.
3 See, e.g., Lauren Gambino et al., Thousands March To Protest Against Police
Brutality in Major US Cities, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2014, 10:58 PM);
4 See, e.g., Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Law Enforcement Overview
(May
29,
2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/lawenforcement.aspx (reporting that state legislatures evaluated “hundreds of pieces
of legislation that address policing issue during 2015 sessions”).
5 See, e.g., Monica Davey, Chicago Pays $5 Million Over Killing of Teenager,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2015, at A15 (reporting a $5 million settlement in the case of
Laquan McDonald); Richard Fausset, Settlement Reached in Shooting by Officer,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2015, at A24 (reporting $6.5 million settlement in death of
Walter Scott); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Baltimore Announces $6.4 Million Settlement
in the Death of Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2015, at A20 (reporting $6.4
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Prosecutors have finally begun to put police officers at the defendant’s
table. 6 Progress will be slow, we know, because the police are
notoriously difficult to change.7 All the more reason, one might think,
to continue the frontal attack.
This Article is about something drier, more technical and obscure,
and less democratic than all that, or so it may initially appear. But it’s
something that may be just as important to the mission of police
reform: police liability insurance. Municipalities nationwide purchase
insurance to indemnify themselves against liability for the acts of their
law enforcement officers. 8
These insurance policies shield the
government from financial responsibility, often including punitive
damages, for common law and constitutional torts including assault and
battery, excessive force, discrimination, false arrest, and false

million settlement for the death of Freddie Gray, which “[l]egal specialists said …
was in line with settlements for recent racially charged police misconduct cases,”
including Eric Garner, whose estate settled for $5.9 million).
6 See, e.g., Ian Simpson, Prosecution of U.S. Police for Killings Surges to
Highest in Decade, HUFFPOST POLITICS (Oct. 26, 2015, 9:21 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/prosecution-policekillings_us_562e26aee4b0ec0a3894eb23.
7 See, e.g., CMTY. RELATIONS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF GOOD
POLICING: AVOIDING VIOLENCE BETWEEN POLICE AND CITIZENS (rev. 2003) (“The
culture of a police department, once established, is difficult to change.”); JEROME H.
SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE 211 (1986) (“All organizations
resist change, but one is hard put to think of any more resistant than the police.”);
SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY 28 (2d ed. 2014) (“The challenge of sustaining [police] reforms is
enormous.”); Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, 18 POLICING & SOC’Y 27 (2008)
(“Police reform is risky and hard, and efforts to innovate in policing often fall short
of expectations.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not To Be Like Sisyphus: Can Defense
Counsel Overcome Pervasive Status Quo Bias in the Criminal Justice System?, 45
TEX. TECH L. REV. 315, 360-61 (2012) (“There is an extensive literature on police
officers’ inability to change their enforcement methods despite evidence that their
conduct leads to mistaken convictions.”); Donovan X. Ramsey, Police Reform Is
Impossible in America, JUSTICE (Feb. 3, 2015, 11:50 AM), http://justice.gawker.com/
police-reform-is-impossible-in-america-1683262551 (“[A]s long as the public insists
on its myth of black criminality—almost as an article of faith—police practices will
be impossible to reform.”).
8 It appears, moreover, that municipalities are opting to insure an increasing
proportion of their total liability risk, which presumably includes their law
enforcement risk. See PUB. RISK MGMT. ASS’N & PUB. ENTITY RISK INST., 2005 COST
OF RISK SURVEY 5-6 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 COST OF RISK SURVEY] (reporting that
municipalities paid 57% of their total cost of risk toward insurance premiums in
2004, compared to only 33% in 1998); see also id. at 13 (reporting that liability
premiums increased from 0.41% of the operating budget of state and local public
entities in 1998 to 2.98% in 2004).
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imprisonment. 9 Yet legal scholars know next to nothing about the
effect of this insurance on police behavior—either its potential or its
pitfalls. Indeed, legal scholarship has omitted insurers from even its
richest models of policing.10 This is a dangerous blind spot: “[I]t is
unsound to discuss any objective that might be imputed to th[e tort]
system”—such as reducing police misconduct—“without considering
both the incidence of liability insurance and the relationship of that
objective to liability insurance in its various forms.”11
See, e.g., Professional Liability, APEX INS. SERVS., http://apexinsurance.com/
professional-liability/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (advertising coverage for
“Intentional Acts,” “Violation of Civil Rights,” and “Assault and Battery”); Public
Entity
Solutions,
Breckenridge
Ins.
Servs.
(Apr.
28,
2015),
http://www.breckgrp.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Brokerage_PUBLICENTITY_042814.pdf (listing “Civil Rights Violations/Discrimination” among
available “enhancements”); “But, It Will Never Happen to Us, Right?”, Travelers
Ins. (2009), https://www.travelers.com/business-insurance/specialized-industries/
public-sector/docs/59471.pdf (advertising coverage for “allegations of civil rights
violations such as excessive force” and for punitive damages); Police Professional,
GOV’TAL UNDERWRITERS, INC., http://www.pgui.com/View.aspx?page=coverage/
police (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (including punitive damages and “civil rights
violations” among “Selected Policy Features”); Public Entity Insurance Program,
Trident
Ins.
Servs.
(Feb.
2015),
https://www.argolimited.com/media/
03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/5d712b15651c2aa74d9f1c321efd22744d446ebd/
YCX321Z60978/Trident_PE_Brochure_-_Web_2.4.15.pdf (advertising coverage for
“Civil Rights Violations,” “False Arrest,” and “Canine/Equine Exposures”).
10 In a recent working paper, Joanna Schwartz observes that some
municipalities carry liability insurance—and that the insurers that write these
policies may create “an important and underappreciated litigation effect for law
enforcement”—and concludes that “[f]urther research could better understand the
ways in which these insurers function and the pressures they impose on law
enforcement.” Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and
Police Reform 4, 37 (UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 15-23),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2635673 [hereinafter Schwartz,
How Governments Pay]; see also Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?,
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. __ (listing insurers among potential “police reformers”);
CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL 115-37 (2009) (including insurance among a
list of variables in a regression analysis to explain the degree of “legalized
accountability” among police agencies).
11 Gary T. Schwartz, Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 313, 364 (1990); see also Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, The Law
and Economics of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical and Empirical Review, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 169, 169 (Jennifer Arlen ed.,
2013) (“[L]ittle or nothing in tort law makes sense except in the light of liability
insurance.”); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Liability and Liability Insurance: Chicken and
Egg, Destructive Spiral, or Risk and Reaction?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1678 (1994)
(“The presence of liability coverage alters the legal landscape more than most
observers recognize.”).
9
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Insurance theory warns us first of moral hazard—the propensity of
insurance to reduce the insured’s incentive to prevent harm. So, for
example, upon learning that the Republican Party had purchased a $10
million police liability policy for St. Paul before holding the Republican
National Convention there in 2008, one activist fretted, “[n]ow the
police have nothing to hold them back from egregious behavior.” 12
Implicit in this thinking is an assumption—surprisingly complex but
probably sustainable—that the threat of constitutional tort liability
would, absent indemnification through insurance, deter police
misconduct by making the police internalize the cost of any harms they
cause.13 Liability insurance dilutes, or even neutralizes, deterrence by
transferring the risk of liability from the municipality to the insurer.
Given the kinds of grave damage police misconduct can inflict, the
possibility of underdeterrence is troubling.
But moral hazard is just the beginning. When the insurer assumes
the risk of liability, it also develops a financial incentive to reduce that
risk through loss prevention. By reducing risk, the insurer lowers its
payouts under the liability policy and thus increases profits. An
effective loss-prevention program can also help the insurer compete for
business by offering lower premiums. In other words, an insurer
writing police liability insurance may profit by reducing police
misconduct. Its contractual relationship with the municipality gives it
the means and influence necessary to do so—to “regulate” the
municipality it insures. In fact, it may be better positioned than the
government to reform police behavior. 14 Relative to government
regulators, the insurer may possess superior information, such as data
that cut across myriad police agencies; deeper and more nimble
resources, including “boots on the ground” and the capacity to develop
harm-prevention technologies; market incentives that favor good, but
12 Minn. GOP Convention Officials Bought Liability Coverage in First Time
Deal, INS. J., Sept. 5, 2008.
13 See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986) (“[T]he
damages a plaintiff recovers contributes significantly to the deterrence of civil
rights violations in the future”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for
Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 240 (2013) (arguing that making
“damages for constitutional violations routine” would “heighten the disincentives
for government to engage in conduct that might result in constitutional
violations”).
14 That insurers can outperform governmental regulators is the thesis of Omri
Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197 (2012); see also EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT
A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK 100 (1982) (contrasting government regulators’ “rule
oriented” factory inspections, which focus narrowly on mechanical and physical
issues, with insurers’ broader emphasis on the “attitude of management”).
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not overzealous, risk-management policies; and the flexibility to develop
and prescribe individualized risk-reduction plans. If it uses the lossprevention tools at its disposal, the insurer can therefore reintroduce, or
possibly even enhance, constitutional tort law’s deterrent effects.15 In
other words, far from creating moral hazard, police liability insurance
may be a neglected backdoor route to police reform.
Through the lens of this theoretical framework, and based on trade
literature and interviews with nearly thirty insurance industry
representatives, civil rights litigators, municipal attorneys, consultants,
and more, this Article describes and begins to assess the contemporary
market for municipal liability insurance in the law enforcement
context. While not ignoring moral hazard, I focus on the less familiar
ways in which insurers can perform a traditionally governmental
regulatory role, both by operationalizing behavioral norms the
government espouses and imposing rules of their own devise. I also
consider how the government can, in turn, regulate the insurers as a
means to regulate the police.
In addition to its evident relevance to ongoing conversations about
police reform, the Article makes three significant theoretical
contributions that are woven throughout the Parts that follow. First,
the Article inverts the ordinary model of governance as public
regulation of private action. That insurance may be understood as
“regulation” is a notion increasingly familiar to legal audiences. 16
15 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY 228 (2008) (describing
how “a version of tort law’s deterrence function has slowly been incorporated into
insurance”); Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120
(1982) (providing theoretical proof that, under certain conditions, liability
insurance is socially desirable). For a trenchant introduction of the competing riskenhancing and risk-reducing effects of insurance, and the stakes of the inquiry, see
TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY
INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 1-3 (2010).
16 There are countless scholarly assertions of this principle.
For several
examples drawn from a single volume of essays, see Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon,
Embracing Risk, in EMBRACING RISK 1, 13 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds.,
2002) (“[I]nsurance is one of the greatest sources of regulatory authority over
private life.”); Carol A. Heimer, Insuring More, Ensuring Less: The Costs and
Benefits of Private Regulation Through Insurance, in EMBRACING RISK, supra, at
116, 119 (describing “insurance’s role as one of the main regulatory institutions of
contemporary societies”); Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as
Moral Opportunity, in EMBRACING RISK, supra, at 52, 62 (“Insurance is a form of
what Foucauldian scholars call ‘discipline,’ that is, a system of inculcating norms,
supervising behavior, and enforcing compliance with norms.”). On the related
concept of insurance as “governance,” see RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS
GOVERNANCE (2003); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE 133-34 (1996)
(describing insurers’ increasing “authority” over the world’s market and political

6

Insurers, we now know, enforce (or undermine) common law, statutory,
and regulatory principles through their contractual relationships with
the private actors they insure.
A rich and growing literature
investigates the tradeoff between moral hazard and loss prevention in
such diverse fields as legal malpractice, 17 medical malpractice, 18
corporate governance, 19 employment practices, 20 motion pictures, 21
environmental hazards,22 firearms,23 and personal injury.24 This Article
is, however, the first to show how the phenomenon of regulation by
insurance extends as well to public actors, whose behavior private
insurers regulate according to constitutional and not just positive law.
Second, and closely related, the Article illustrates how, in the course
of regulating, insurers not only enforce the Constitution, but also
construct its meaning. This happens because the most salient standard
of liability in this context asks whether the police have violated the
economies, defined as “the power to alter or modify the behaviour of others by
using incentives and disincentives to affect the choice and range of options”).
17 George M. Cohen, Legal Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A
Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305 (1997);
Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 209 (1997).
18 E.g., Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice
Liability on the Delivery of Health Care, 8 F. HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y, Art. 4 (2005);
Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54
DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2005); Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical
Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207
(2005); see also Richard L. Abbott et al., Medical Professional Liability Insurance
and Its Relation to Medical Error and Healthcare Risk Management for the
Practicing Physician, 140 AM. J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 1106 (2005).
19 BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 15.
20 E.g., Francis J. Mootz III, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination
Claims, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1997); Shauhin H. Talesh, Legal Intermediaries:
How Insurance Companies Construct the Meaning of Compliance with AntiDiscrimination Laws, 37 LAW & POL’Y 209 (2015); Nancy H. Van der Veer, Note,
Employment Practices Liability Insurance: Are EPLI Policies a License To
Discriminate? Or Are They a Necessary Reality Check for Employers?, 12 CONN. INS.
L.J. 173 (2005).
21 Elizabeth O. Hubbart, When Worlds Collide: The Intersection of Insurance
and Motion Pictures, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 267 (1997); see also Edward Jay Epstein,
Nicole Kidman’s Knee: Or, How the Insurance Business Runs Hollywood, SLATE,
May 23, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2119328.
22 E.g., Haitao Yin et al., Risk-Based Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does
the Private Insurance Market Reduce Environmental Accidents?, 54 J.L. & ECON.
325 (2011).
23 Tom Baker & Thomas O. Farrish, Liability Insurance and the Regulation of
Firearms, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY 292 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005).
24 STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 12-18
(1989).
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Constitution. 25 This observation situates the Article within, and
contributes to, two distinct literatures: First, the Article speaks to
constitutional theory about “the Constitution outside the courts.” The
notion that elected officials and administrative agencies engage in
constitutional construction is by now familiar. 26 These insightful
accounts overlook, however, that private actors like insurance
companies do so too. And they do so in ways that state actors typically
do not—for example, insurers explicitly rank-order constitutional rights
on consequentialist grounds. What is more, the discretion baked into
substantive constitutional doctrine, coupled with qualified immunity,
ensures that courts rarely overturn insurers’ constitutional
pronouncements.
The recognition that insurers construe the Constitution contributes,
second, to legal and socio-legal work on how institutions and
intermediaries mediate legal norms while translating them into
workaday policies and protocols—how, in other words, “all this law
filters into the nooks and crannies of social life.”27 Among other things,
25 Federal civil rights claims predicated on constitutional violations are not
subject to state-law immunities or damages caps that limit municipal exposure to
state-law claims.
26 On the role of legislatures, see, for example, THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH:
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE (Richard Bauman &
Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Keith E. Whittington,
Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119 (2010). On
administrative agencies, see Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking:
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L.
REV. 799 (2010); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 1897 (2013); Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism,
95 B.U. L. REV. 519 (2015); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991) (arguing that, in extraordinary moments, “the People” make
constitutional law as well); Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar Constitutional Law, 86
AM. BANKR. L.J. 3 (2012) (discussing how bankruptcy judges interpret the
Constitution differently from Supreme Court Justices); Justin Driver, Supremacies
and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 1053 (2014) (challenging the
portrayal of judicial supremacy as a “power grab”); Ernest A. Young,
Constitutionalism Outside the Courts, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 843 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2015) (reviewing theories on
constitutionalism outside the courts).
27 Jeb Barnes & Thomas F. Burke, The Diffusion of Rights: From Law on the
Books to Organizational Rights Practices, 40 LAW & SOC’Y 493, 494 (2006); see, e.g.,
EPP, supra note 10; Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992); Sharon
Gilad, Beyond Endogeneity: How Firms and Regulators Co-Construct the Meaning
of Regulation, 36 LAW & POL’Y 134 (2014); Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, The
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in the hands of insurers, liability for constitutional violations and other
police misconduct becomes “loss” to the police agency, which must be
“controlled.”28 Perhaps surprisingly, by denaturing the law in this way
and stripping it of its moral valence, insurers may actually advance the
law’s aims. Insurers remove legal principles from the realm of moral
and legal contestation and render them more palatable to police
officers, who are not made to feel like they’re doing something immoral
by endeavoring to enforce the criminal law aggressively. The fight over
police accountability is no longer a battle between good and evil, right
and wrong, but simply reflects a desire to avoid the “loss” that occurs
when (exogenously determined) legal rules are broken.
Finally, the Article helps pry open the “black box of deterrence.”29
In fact, given widespread indemnification of both individual and
municipal liability for constitutional torts committed by police, 30 an
understanding of how insurers manage police risk is essential to any
persuasive theory of civil deterrence of police misconduct. What we see
is that insurers transform vague, uncertain liability exposure into finely
grained policies backed by differentiated premiums and the threat of
coverage denial. That is a substantial part of how civil liability deters
misconduct in insured jurisdictions.
The Article unfurls as follows. Part I begins by introducing some
basic concepts from insurance theory—how insurance works, why
municipalities buy it, and its potential effects on behavior through the
polar forces of moral hazard and loss prevention. It previews, at a
conceptual level, the kinds of tools insurers can use to manage liability
Reconstitution of Law in Local Settings: Agency Discretion, Ambiguity, and a
Surplus of Law in the Policing of Hate Crime, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 893 (2005);
Talesh, Rule-Intermediaries in Action: How State and Business Stakeholders
Influence the Meaning of Consumer Rights in Regulatory Governance
Arrangements, 37 LAW & POL’Y 1 (2015).
28 Cf. Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that
Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 10-12 (2005)
(discussing how insurers transform law into rules of thumb that deemphasize
individual fault and facilitate efficient resolution); Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace,
27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 511 (1993) (finding that, in employers’ internal systems
for resolving discrimination complaints, “allegations of rights violations are often
recast as typical managerial problems”); Talesh, supra note 20, at 211, 226-28
(arguing that “insurance field actors … recontextualize antidiscrimination laws
around a nonlegal risk logic that dominates discourse concerning what constitutes
discrimination”).
29 See Margo Schlanger, Operationalizing Deterrence: Claims Management (in
Hospitals, a Large Retailer, and Jails and Prisons), 2 J. TORT L. 1, 1 (2008).
30 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885
(2014) (finding that municipalities indemnify police officers over 99% of the time).
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risk, focusing on loss prevention and underwriting. Part I then
describes the tripartite market for police liability insurance, beginning
with a brief history that tracks the market’s trends and dislocations.
An insurance crisis in the 1980s fostered the development of
intergovernmental
risk
pools—quasi-governmental
associations
through which municipalities pool their risk—as an alternative to
commercial coverage. These pools still thrive today. Municipalities
that neither purchase commercial coverage nor join a pool—a group
that includes the country’s largest cities—opt instead to self-insure.
This can mean anything from simply “going bare” to running a
sophisticated in-house risk management program. Along the way, this
Part introduces a cast that includes not only private insurance
companies and risk pools, but also consultants, reinsurers, accreditors,
and even credit rating agencies. Part I concludes by reviewing some
key features of the most common forms on which police liability policies
are written.
Part II is the Article’s heart. Based on 29 interviews with
individuals involved in, or who interact with, the police liability
insurance industry, as well as trade literature, insurance applications,
advertisements, and other primary sources, Part II describes in detail
the measures that insurers take to prevent loss under the liability
policies they write—that is, how insurers work to reduce police
misconduct. Insurers’ methods include education and policy guidance
on topics ranging from the quotidian (e.g., effecting an arrest) to the
high-profile (e.g., strip searches and “high-excitement risk like PIT
maneuvers,” vehicle pursuits in which the police force a fleeing car to
lose control and stop).31 Insurers also help municipalities train their
officers. For example, leveraging economies of scale, insurers can
provide expensive “virtual reality” training on driving and use-of-force
simulators.
And, as in the private-industry setting, insurance
companies audit police practices, either themselves or by outsourcing to
accreditation agencies. One insurer I interviewed even told of sending
representatives incognito to visit bars frequented by police officers to
listen and observe the local police culture.
The carrots and sticks that drive municipalities to cooperate in
these loss-prevention initiatives are the availability and pricing of
coverage, which both affect the public fisc directly and educate covered
agencies about the likelihood they’ll be hit with embarrassing and
Travelers Ins., The Search for the Best Strip Search Policy, THE PUBLIC
FORUM (June 2010), https://www.travelers.com/iwcm/Distribution/2010/06_June/
7627/article-1.html;
Municipalities,
BERKSHIRE
INS.
GRP.,
https://www.berkshireinsurancegroup.com/municipalities (last visited Aug. 31,
2015).
31
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politically problematic lawsuits. My evidence suggests, moreover, that
insurers’ incentives can affect the care with which police agencies
function. In response to incentives insurers provide, police agencies
adopt or amend departmental policies on important subjects like the
use of force and firearms. They change the way they train their officers.
And they even fire problem officers, from the beat all the way up to the
chief. As in other, more familiar contexts, insurance can have activitylevel effects as well, impacting not only the quality but also the
quantity of policing. In extreme cases, municipalities have shut down
their police forces after their insurers pulled coverage.
My principal objective is to show that insurance companies can and
do shape police behavior or, at the least, influence policies, practices,
and personnel decisions that are themselves proven or presumed to
affect behavior. For this reason, it matters little that my sources—
while diverse along several dimensions—are not necessarily a
nationally representative sample. It may be, for example, that the
insurers I interviewed are, by happenstance, unusually aggressive
about managing police risk, and that most insurers take a more laissez
faire approach. In that case, my findings suggest that we can improve
police behavior by using the law to encourage the average insurer to
regulate more closely. Similarly, I cannot, with available data, prove
that insurers today are actually reducing police misconduct relative to
self-insurance. My aim is more modest—to prove that their leverage
over municipalities makes them capable of doing so. Given how
difficult police reform is known to be, this alone changes the landscape.
Part III poses and provisionally answers some normative questions
stemming from the system Part II describes. First, what exactly can we
say about the present effect of insurance on the rate of police
misconduct? Second, should we be worried that insurers may regulate
the police too aggressively? Third, how does the presence of liability
insurance interact with mechanisms of democratic accountability that
are thought to constrain (or legitimize) police behavior? Writing in the
early 1980s, Peter Schuck of Yale Law School questioned the
desirability of widespread insurance for public malfeasance. “[I]nsurers
that underwrite risks of liability for official misconduct,” Schuck
reasoned, “would presumably insist upon some influence over the
agency policy and personnel decisions that affect the magnitude of those
risks.”32 This would be, thought Schuck, “a private interference with
public administration that would surely be politically and morally, even
if not legally, objectionable.”33 I will demonstrate that insurers do in
32
33

PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 110 (1983).
Id.
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fact wield the sort of influence Schuck presumed they would demand. If
his normative claim is sound, therefore, there is much to reconsider
about our system. But is it sound? Fourth, how might the involvement
of the insurance industry, a quintessential repeat player in litigation,
affect the content of the law that regulates police? Finally, what role
might there be for law to regulate police liability insurance in an effort
to drive down police misconduct? In this last section, I consider several
potential legal reforms, including a mandate that all municipalities
obtain coverage, a ban on “first-dollar” (no-deductible) policies that may
reduce municipal care, and a requirement that small municipalities
pool their risks and resources before buying insurance on the
commercial market.
Part IV concludes.
Now is an urgent time to consider these issues. Not only is the
public more focused on policing than at any time in recent memory, but
so too are insurers. The Rodney King assault in 1992, one expert told
me, had “ripple effects” throughout the insurance industry.34 Insurers
reacted by making sure that police agencies had adequate policies and
procedures on the use of force and closely related risks. After some
time, however, attention waned as other sources of municipal liability
captured insurers’ focus. Today, in light of recent events, insurers find
themselves “back in the soup.” 35 Many now understand that the
problems with police go “beyond policies and procedures”; in order to
reduce police misconduct, insurers “need to find the root cause.”36 Their
success could pay dividends to us all.
I. THE PROVISION OF POLICE LIABILITY INSURANCE
I begin, in Section A, with some basic insurance concepts and
terminology, intended for the uninitiated. Sections B and C give a brisk
34 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F (July 24, 2015); see also
Robert W. Esenberg, Risk Management in the Public Sector, RISK MGMT., Mar.
1992, at 72, 74 (stating that Rodney King “caused concerns in every jurisdiction
over liability exposures”).
35 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34.
36 Id.; accord Telephone Interview with Commercial Broker B (July 22, 2015)
(agreeing that underwriters have become deeply concerned with police liability
since Ferguson); Zusha Elinson & Dan Frosch, Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases
Soars in Big U.S. Cities; Data Show Rising Payouts for Police-Misconduct
Settlements and Court Judgments, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2015 (“[I]nsurers and
lawyers who defend police say current scrutiny of law enforcement is broadly
affecting the resolution of lawsuits.”); see also Roberto Ceniceros, Scandals Can
Influence Police Liability Coverage, BUS. INS., June 5, 2000, at 4 (discussing the
effect of police scandals on rates and coverage nationwide).
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history and current overview, respectively, of the market for police
liability insurance.
Section C introduces the industry’s cast of
characters and highlights the pervasive influence of private actors, even
in arrangements that, on the surface, appear to be purely public.
Section C also discusses the considerations that inform a municipality’s
decision of how to insure, and with whom. Section D walks through the
terms of a typical police liability policy.
My subject, to be clear, is county and local law enforcement, whose
officers make up the vast majority of officers nationwide;37 I use the
terms “municipal” and “police” to embrace both the county and city
level. Insurance for state and federal law enforcement is not within the
Article’s scope, but may be a fruitful subject of future research.38
My description draws largely from primary sources including
insurance policies and applications, promotional and educational
materials put out by insurers, trade literature, and twenty-nine
interviews with members of the industry, typically high-ranking
officials within their respective firms. My interview subjects were
geographically diverse, including representatives of firms in every time
zone and consultants who travel the country. And while each risk pool
services members only within a single state, the commercial insurers—
and especially the larger reinsurers—have policyholders all over. Some
of my subjects requested anonymity, and I have decided for
consistency’s sake to refer to all of the interviews using only generic,

37 See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 2008, at 1 (2012) (reporting 120,000 sworn
federal officers in 2008); BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES,
2008, at 2 tbl.1 (2011) (reporting roughly 644,000 county and local sworn officers in
2008).
38 As in the local systems, it appears that the federal government is the real
party in interest when federal officers are sued. It pays for officers’ representation
and reimburses them when they settle or pay judgments. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard,
Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual
Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 65, 74-79 (1999). The federal government
also pays half of any insurance premiums for individual professional liability
policies that officers purchase.
See Appropriations, 2000—Treasury, Postal
Service, Executive Office of the President, and General Government, Pub. L. No.
106-58, § 642, 113 Stat. 430, 477 (1999); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act,
1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 636, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-363 to -364 (1996). That
insurance provides for counsel if the government declines a representation request
and indemnifies officers up to $2 million. Pillard, supra, at 78 n.62; Federal
Employee
Professional
Liability—Benefit
Highlights,
WRIGHT
USA,
http://www.wrightusa.com/products/federal-employee-professional-liability//benefit-highlights/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
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non-identifying descriptors except where a subject did not request
anonymity and his identity is clear (or knowable) from context.39
A. A Conceptual Overview of Liability Insurance
Insurance, for my purposes, is an arrangement in which one party,
the insurer, agrees to reimburse the other party, the insured, for losses
suffered upon the occurrence of certain events specified in an insurance
policy.40 In exchange, the insured pays a premium to the insurer that
tends to approximate the insured’s expected losses plus some margin
for administrative costs and, typically, profits. Liability insurance,
specifically, protects the insured in the event he is sued on a legal claim
covered by the policy. This is a type of third-party insurance—the
insured (the first party) purchases the policy from the insurer (the
second party) for protection against the actions of the plaintiff (the third
party), who alleges an injury caused by the insured. When the plaintiff

39 The interviews were conducted by telephone and ranged from twenty
minutes to over an hour in duration. They were semistructured, revolving around
a basic set of common questions but also seizing on additional topics that interview
subjects raised. In some instances I followed up with subjects by email or
telephone to clarify or expand upon a point we had discussed; I did not count these
contacts toward the total number of interviews reported in the text. I located the
subjects of my interviews using a “snowball sampling” technique. See, e.g., JOHN
LOFLAND ET AL., ANALYZING SOCIAL SETTINGS: A GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE
OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS 41-43 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing “snowball” or “chainreferral” sampling: “a method for generating a field sample of individuals
possessing the characteristics of interest by asking initial contacts if they could
name a few individuals with similar characteristics who might agree to be
interviewed”); see also Patrick Biernacki & Dan Waldorf, Snowball Sampling:
Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling, 10 SOC. METHODS & RES.
141, 141 (1981) (describing the method as “widely used” and exploring some of its
difficulties).
I ceased interviewing new subjects when responses became
repetitious.
40 This overview is drawn from numerous sources, including KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 463-681(5th ed. 2010); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 82 (5th ed. 1984);
Ronen Avraham, The Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 19 CONN. INS. L.J.
29, 35-42 (2012); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort
Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1539-50 (1987); Gary T. Schwartz, Insurance, Deterrence
and Liability, in PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 335 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998). For a quick technical background, see ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 43-49 (6th ed. 2012). For more capacious and
theoretical conceptions of “insurance,” see Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions
of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013); Baker & Simon, supra note 16, at 7-10;
Cohen, supra note 17, at 310-14.
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sues the insured, the insurer has both a right and duty to defend the
suit.
It is worth considering why the parties enter into these
arrangements. In many situations, especially involving individual
insureds, the insured is risk averse. This means that he dislikes
uncertainty and is willing to pay to reduce it. Insurance allows him to
do just this—he gets to pay, for example, a certain $1,000 insurance
premium rather than face a 1% chance of suffering a $100,000 loss.
Actually, he is willing to—and does—pay somewhat more than $1,000
because he benefits (given that he is risk averse) from transferring the
risk to the insurer. The insurer is willing to take on the risk largely
because it can pool the risk with many others (from other insureds), a
form of risk aggregation. Risk aggregation exploits a mathematical
theorem called the Law of Large Numbers, which states that increasing
the size of a pool of uncorrelated risks will reduce variance—a measure
of risk—and therefore reduce the risk for each member of the pool.41 In
addition to reducing risks by aggregating them, insurers can diversify
their risks across multiple lines of business and profit by investing the
premiums they collect. They can also access reinsurance markets that
allow them to cede part or all of the risks they insure to reinsurers,
whose risk portfolios are even larger and more diverse.
Some insureds, however, are thought to be risk neutral rather than
risk averse. These include corporations and, importantly for present
purposes, the government. The government is risk neutral, we assume,
because it can spread its risks across a broad base of taxpayers and
diversify them by owning a wide variety of investments.42 Given the
justification of insurance stated above, then—which was grounded in
risk aversion—why would the government ever purchase insurance?
There are several reasons. First, the assumption of risk neutrality,
even if generally valid for public entities, may prove false in some
circumstances. For example, a municipality contemplating a loss large
in size relative to its tax base—such as a small town facing a multimillion-dollar judgment or even a big city facing a truly catastrophic
loss—may exhibit risk aversion. 43 Similarly, a city that would
encounter substantial political barriers to reallocating the costs of harm

41 Risks are uncorrelated, or statistically independent, “when the occurrence of
one event does not alter the probability of the other.” Priest, supra note 40, at 1540
n.98.
42 See Paul K. Freeman, Natural Hazard Risk and Privatization, in BUILDING
SAFER CITIES: THE FUTURE OF DISASTER RISK 33, 37 (Alcira Kreimer et al. eds.,
2003).
43 Id. at 38.
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to the taxpayers may be a poor risk-bearer.44 Second, agency costs may
cause the government to behave as though it were risk averse. If the
individuals who make the insurance-purchasing decisions are risk
averse—perhaps because they’ve made substantial entity-specific
investments in human capital—then the entity itself may appear risk
averse as well.45 Third, by translating large and uncertain liabilities
into steady, relatively predictable premium payments, insurance helps
stabilize the budget and avoid fluctuations in local taxes that might
otherwise be necessary to satisfy substantial judgments.46 And fourth,
the government may value services the insurer bundles with the
promise of indemnification, such as loss prevention. 47 Because the
insurer is responsible for paying any losses its loss-prevention program
fails to prevent, its advice is especially credible.48 It is also economical,
because the insurer acquires the information on which its lossprevention initiatives are based as a natural incident to underwriting
and claims evaluation.49
This last point raises another conceptual question, however: If
insurers are in the business of insuring risk, why would they want to
reduce risk in the first place? Again there are several explanations.50
One relates to the point just made—because the insurer bears the risk
of loss, once the insured has paid the premium, any loss prevented
Id.
See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 15, at 72-76; Schwartz, supra note 11, at
322 n.40; cf. Jennifer H. Arlen, Should Defendants’ Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 413, 419-20 (1992); Li-Ming Han, Managerial Compensation and Corporate
Demand for Insurance, 63 J. RISK & INS. 381 (1996).
46 See THOMAS W. RYNARD, INSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT FOR STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS § 1.01 (2009). Smoothing taxation may reduce the political
costs of adverse judgments by reducing the salience of the judgments.
47 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 205; Victor P. Goldberg, The
Devil Made Me Do It: The Corporate Purchase of Insurance, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 541,
543-44 (2009); David Mayers & Clifford Smith, On the Corporate Demand for
Insurance, 55 J. BUS. 281, 285-86, 288-89 (1982). For additional theories from the
corporate literature that may apply to public entities, see Mayers & Smith, supra,
at 286 (conflicts of interest between managers and owners due to divergent time
horizons); Göran Skogh, The Transaction Cost Theory of Insurance: Contracting
Impediments and Costs, 56 J. RISK & INS. 726 (1989) (transaction costs).
48 See Cohen, supra note 17, at 343; Mayers & Smith, supra note 47, at 288.
49 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 356.
50 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 47, at 203-04 (listing several of the
rationales that follow). For a theoretical proof that “investment in loss prevention
can increase an insurer’s potential to earn underwriting profits,” see Harris
Schlesinger & Emilio Venezian, Insurance Markets with Loss-Prevention Activity:
Profits, Market Structure, and Consumer Welfare, 17 RAND J. ECON. 227, 237
(1986).
44
45

16

benefits the insurer. An insurer that can reduce risk efficiently,
furthermore, can offer lower premiums and attract more business from
competitors or from among the uninsured. It can also use riskreduction programs to help find “good risk”—customers that are willing
to adopt loss-control measures are more likely to be profitable
customers whose behavior results in fewer losses.
Good risk
management may also improve an insurer’s credit rating and its
position in the reinsurance market.
Although liability insurance is commonplace today, it was not
always so. At common law, in fact, liability insurance was thought to
violate public policy.51 The reason relates to what we today call moral
hazard. Moral hazard is the propensity of insurance to reduce the
insured’s incentives to prevent harm.52 In other words, moral hazard
captures the concern that people will act less carefully when they (or
the entities on behalf of which they act) are covered by insurance.
Although the concept of moral hazard, as its name suggests, traces back
to notions of morality 53 —in extreme cases, the insured may even
purposefully cause a covered harm in order to collect under the policy—
it need not entail any perniciousness on the part of the insured. It is a
natural consequence of the incentives that the indemnification
arrangement creates.
The insurer, in turn, has numerous devices for controlling moral
hazard, which manifest in many of the most familiar features of the
insurance relationship. 54 In this Article, I focus on two of these
devices—loss prevention and underwriting—which themselves are
capacious categories (the content of which I fill in below). These are two
of the features of liability insurance that most plainly resemble
“regulation.”55 Both are forms of ex ante intervention insurers deploy
before a covered harm occurs and an insurance claim is filed. Insurers
also make ex post interventions to manage loss—during claims
See ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 17.
See generally KENNETH ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING
(1971); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996);
Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979).
Technically, I refer here only to ex ante, not ex post, moral hazard. See Baker,
supra, at 270.
53 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 52, at 250-52.
54 See, e.g., Baker & Farrish, supra note 23, at 293-98; Tom Baker & Rick
Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional
Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1416-23 (2013); Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note
14, at 205-16; Heimer, supra note 16, at 121-22. For a helpful table summarizing
these devices, with citations to canonical literature, see Baker & Siegelman, supra
note 11, at 178 tbl. 7.2.
55 See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 54, at 1421-22.
51
52
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management, for example—which can take on a regulatory cast as
well.56
An insurer engages in loss prevention when it helps an insured
identify and implement techniques for reducing the risk of loss.
Insurers have access to large datasets that allow them to assess and
price the effect of particular precautions on risk—questions like
whether an antitheft device is a cost-effective way of reducing the risk
of auto theft. Insurers convey this knowledge to their policyholders in
various ways. They publish newsletters and other guidance; hold or
subsidize training sessions; write and review model policies and
protocols; perform on-site visits and risk audits; and implement what
Omri Ben-Shahar and Kyle Logue have called “private safety codes”—
codes of conduct with standards stricter than governmental regulation,
managed and audited by third parties such as accreditation agencies.57
Underwriting is a process in which the insurer collects information
about the applicant for insurance and decides whether to offer coverage,
for what risks, under what terms, and at what cost. There are several
ways underwriting can encourage less risky behavior by the insured.
The insurer can deny coverage or cancel or refuse to renew an existing
policy unless certain loss-prevention measures are adopted. It can
charge higher premiums to riskier customers, as identified through
either experience rating—based on loss history—or feature rating—
based on the presence of traits correlated with riskiness.58 These socalled differentiated premiums operate similarly to a Pigouvian tax.59
And the insurer can require the insured to keep “skin in the game” by
imposing a deductible, coinsurance obligation, or coverage cap that
provides an incentive for careful behavior.60
B. The 1980s Insurance Crisis and the Rise of Intergovernmental
Risk Pools
Commercial insurers have offered coverage for false arrest by the
police since at least the 1960s.61 The demand for coverage seems to
See generally Schlanger, supra note 29.
See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 211-12; see also Davis, supra
note 17, at 216-20 (describing how legal malpractice liability insurers create “new
forms of restricted conduct”).
58 See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 46, 71-74 (1986).
59 See HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 82 (8th ed. 2008).
60 For empirical evidence that deductibles help control moral hazard, see
Jennifer L. Wang et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Increasing
Deductibles on Moral Hazard, 75 J. RISK & INS. 551 (2008).
61 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A (July 20, 2015) (stating that
the National Sheriffs’ Association has run an insurance program since the 1960s);
56
57
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have risen, as one would expect, with the amount of constitutional tort
litigation, which ticked upward after Monroe v. Pape 62 in 1961 and
continued to rise through the 1960s and ‘70s.63 By 1976, one national
study found, 65% of surveyed municipalities carried insurance to
protect their employees; many of the insurance programs had not been
operating long.64
In the mid-1970s, the supply of municipal liability insurance
contracted. By one account, premiums doubled between 1974 and
1976.65 Municipal managers began to worry about coverage stability;
one police department reportedly shut down in 1976 after its insurer
cut ties.66 Relief was not forthcoming. Premiums continued to rise and,
by late 1977, alarms sounded as many police agencies found themselves
uninsured. 67
Then—and only then—did the law enforcement
community begin to express “dismay about legal liability.”68 Yet around
the same time, market conditions actually began to improve. Coverage
expanded and prices dropped at record levels. This continued for about
half a decade.69 Then, in early 1983, new signs of trouble appeared.
Reinsurers began to fold at a rate of one per month.70 Before long, the
see Colson v. Lloyd’s of London, 435 S.W.2d 42, 43, 45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968)
(discussing “False Arrest Insurance” in effect since at least 1964 and mentioning a
“master policy issued to the National Sheriffs’ Association”).
62 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding state officials, including police officers,
amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even when they violate state law).
63 EPP, supra note 10, at 71-72 (describing the rising number of police
misconduct cases in the 1970s and early 1980s); Kevin Krajick, The Liability
Crisis: Who Will Insure the Police?, POLICE, Mar. 1978, at 33, 33 (same for 1967 to
1971); Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 NW. U.L. REV. 277, 326 n.249 (1965) (reporting that, only two years
after Monroe, Section 1983 litigation had grown by over sixty percent).
64 CHARLES S. RHYNE ET AL., TORT LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF MUNICIPAL
OFFICIALS 340-43 (1976).
65 NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, THE NEW WORLD OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY 3 (1978).
66 See EPP, supra note 10, at 95; Krajick, supra note 63, at 33.
67 See EPP, supra note 10, at 95; Krajick, supra note 63, at 34; Robert F.
Thomas, Insurance for Police Agencies, POLICE CHIEF, Jan. 1979, at 16, 16
(“November 1, 1977, was a day of reckoning for a substantial number of law
enforcement agencies around the country which suddenly found themselves
without police professional liability insurance coverage.”); see also NAT’L LEAGUE OF
CITIES, supra note 65, at 3 (reporting in April 1978 that municipal liability
insurance was extremely expensive or even unavailable).
68 EPP, supra note 10, at 95-96.
69 Mark Ferraro, Municipal Liability Insurance Crisis, in NAT’L LEAGUE OF
CITIES, MUNICIPAL LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 1, 1 (1987); see also Gene C.
Lai & Robert C. Witt, Changed Insurer Expectations: An Insurance-Economics View
of the Commercial Liability Crisis, 10 J. INS. REG. 342, 343 (1992).
70 Ferraro, supra note 69, at 2.
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market spiraled downward. The resulting crisis affected many lines of
liability insurance, but municipalities were some of the hardest hit.71
Police liability insurance, for practical purposes, had vanished.
Governments panicked. A number of municipalities shut down their
police forces entirely rather than operate without insurance.72
The causes of the crisis remain unclear.73 It was popular at the time
to blame the “epidemic” of constitutional tort litigation fueled by
proliferating plaintiffs’ attorneys and civil liberties groups.74 Today,
“[t]he academic literature has settled on the view that the mid 1980s
liability insurance crisis was an extreme dip in the longstanding
underwriting cycle in property casualty insurance, perhaps exacerbated
by a mid 1980s change in taxation rules governing the reserves held by
property casualty insurance companies.” 75 The underwriting cycle
“refers to the tendency of premiums and restrictions on coverage to rise
and fall as insurers tighten their standards in response to the loss of
See RYNARD, supra note 46, § 1.03 (“From 1983 to 1986, governments
underwent a crisis in insurance availability.”). For contemporaneous coverage of
the crisis, see George J. Church, Sorry, Your Policy Is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24,
1986, at 16; R. Bruce Dold, Insurance Crisis Hits Cities, CHI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 15,
1985; Meg Fletcher, Public Entity Dilemma: Go Bare or Bust, BUS. INS., July 8,
1985, at 1; Scott J. Higham, Municipalities Have No Assurance of Getting
Insurance, MORNING CALL, Sept. 19, 1985; Special, Liability Insurance: A Growing
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1986.
72 See, e.g., Church, supra note 71, at 17, 18.
73 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance
Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1987); Lai & Witt, supra note 69; Kyle D. Logue,
Toward a Tax-Based Explanation of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 82 VA. L. REV.
895 (1996); Priest, supra note 40; Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Crisis and the
Dynamics of Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. REG. 455 (1988).
74 See EPP, supra note 10, at 95-97.
There were a remarkable number of
changes during this period to the law of civil rights liability. Liability was
expanded, see, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (punitive damages available
from individual defendants); Patsy v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)
(exhaustion of state remedies not required); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980)
(liability available for violation of federal statutory law); Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (no qualified immunity for municipalities);
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(municipalities amenable to suit under Section 1983); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975) (no qualified immunity if officer should have known state of the law);
attorney fees became more readily available, see Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641, 2641 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1988); and avenues to non-pecuniary relief were closed, which may have
funneled some additional plaintiffs into damages actions, see, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976) (very narrow standing to seek injunctive relief against police
practices); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (same). For an overview
covering these developments and more, see SCHUCK, supra note 32, at 47-51.
75 Baker & Siegelman, supra note 11, at 187-88 (citations omitted).
71
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capital”—called a “hard market”—“or, alternately, loosen their
standards in order to maintain or grow market share when new capital
enters the market”—a “soft market.”76
The crisis proved temporary but caused lasting changes to the
market for municipal liability insurance of all types. In the vacuum
created by private industry’s withdrawal, state legislatures authorized
local governments to form intergovernmental risk pools (“pools”). The
nature, structure, and regulation of these pools varies from state to
state, but the basic idea is consistent: A pool is a nonprofit, missiondriven organization formed by a group of local government entities
within one state to finance a risk, typically by pooling or sharing that
risk.77 The entities themselves own and govern the pool.78 Technically,
in most states, a pool is not an insurer, does not issue insurance
policies, and is not regulated by the state insurance commissioner—at
least not to the degree a commercial insurer is.79 But the services a
pool provides are virtually indistinguishable from insurance. Where an
insurer issues an insurance policy to a policyholder in exchange for a
premium, a pool writes a “coverage memorandum” to a “member” in
BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 15, at 55.
On the variation in legal structure of pools, see Jason E. Doucette, Note,
Wading in the Pool: Interlocal Cooperation in Municipal Insurance and the State
Regulation of Public Entity Risk Sharing Pools—A Survey, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 533,
542 (2002). Compare R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-5-20.1(c) (corporation), with Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 537.625 (association), and Alaska Stat. § 21.76.030 (“cooperative
agreement”). On the regulatory requirements to which pools are subject, see
RYNARD, supra note 46, § 31.03[2]-[4]; Michelle Baurkot, Into the Pool, BEST’S REV.,
Mar. 1998, at 43, 44-45; Ken Bush, Captive Risk Pools for Public Entities, RISK
FINANCING (2003); Doucette, supra, at 543-62. It appears that, in some pools,
members do not actually share risk but instead purchase insurance as a group.
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-479b(a); KAREN NIXON, PUB. AGENCY RISK SHARING
AUTH. OF CAL., PUBLIC ENTITY POOLING—BUILT TO LAST 1 (2011),
http://www.cajpa.org/documents/Public-Entity-Pooling-Built-to-Last.pdf.
For a
helpful general overview on pools, see Marcos Antonio Mendoza, Reinsurance as
Governance: Governmental Risk Management Pools as a Case Study in the
Governance Role Played by Reinsurance Institutions, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 53, 55-63
(2014), or Peter C. Young, Risk Pools, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AND PUBLIC POLICY 1065 (Jack Rabin ed., 2003).
78 See Doucette, supra note 77, at 538-39.
A few states have “state funds”
rather than intergovernmental pools, which are organized differently. A state fund
is established by statute; it preexists and is somewhat independent of the public
entities that are its members. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.700 et seq.
(establishing the Missouri Public Entity Risk Management Fund). The directors
may include state-level officials and gubernatorial appointees. See, e.g., id. §
537.710. The differences between funds and pools appear to be immaterial for
present purposes, however. See generally RYNARD, supra note 46, § 31.02.
79 See Doucette, supra note 77, at 546, 549, 551, 556.
76
77
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exchange for a “contribution.” 80 Underwriting, loss prevention, and
claims management look similar in the two contexts. 81 Putting
formalities to one side, pools are essentially small mutual insurers.
At the outset, it was unclear whether pools would last or whether
they were merely a stopgap until the market for private coverage
recovered. Starting around 1987, the market did stabilize, and some
commercial insurers began to offer coverage once again.82 The pools
survived—in fact, they proliferated. In 1991, one survey found, 44% of
municipalities purchased police liability coverage from pools.83 Roughly
500 pools operate today nationwide.84
C. The Present-Day Market for Police Liability Insurance
1. Commercial Insurance, Risk Pooling, and Self-Insurance
There are no comprehensive data on the breakdown, by type of
provider, of the market for police liability insurance today. The answer
seems to vary from state to state. In some states, the pools are strong
and there is little or no competition from commercial carriers; the vast
majority of municipalities get their coverage from pools.85 In other
states, the breakdown is more even. And in at least one state, Indiana,
there are no pools that cover police liability risk.86
80 See Bush, supra note 77.
Pools may have developed this terminology
deliberately to distinguish themselves from insurance companies. See NIXON,
supra note 77, at 11.
81 Cf. ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW §8.5, at 569 (1971)
(observing that “the different types of insuring organizations have tended to
become more alike both in formal structure and in practical performance”).
82 D. Michael Enfield, Managing Director, Marsh & McLennan, Inc., Remarks
to the ABA National Institute on Municipal Liability (Oct. 30-31, 1987), in
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY: THE SEARCH FOR THE DEEP POCKET 185, 187 (1987); see also
Doucette, supra note 77, at 546-47 (describing additional “reemergence of private
insurers into the municipal insurance markets” in the late 1990s).
83 ICMA & WYATT CO., LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS LIABILITY INSURANCE:
CURRENT STATUS—1991, at 5 (1991) [hereinafter ICMA Report].
84 NIXON, supra note 77, at 3. Even so, one recent report maintains that it
“may be too soon to determine” whether pools are here to stay. Id. at 14.
85 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A (July 9, 2015) (reporting little
commercial participation in primary insurance market); Telephone Interview with
Risk Pool B (June 29, 2015) (same); see also Alfred G. Haggerty, California City
Launches New Carrier, NAT’L UNDERWRITER, Nov. 15, 1993 (reporting that about
85% of California cities belonged to pools).
86 See Doucette, supra note 77, at 559-61.
Although Doucette wrote over a
decade ago, several of the experts I interviewed confirmed that Indiana still has no
pool that covers police liability risk. Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer
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Still, despite this national variation, certain patterns emerge. (Even
these generalities, however, are tentative, and the data sometimes
conflict.) In many states, small municipalities—under, say, 100,000
people—tend to join pools.87 Medium-sized entities are divided, with
the majority—some estimate 70%—in pools and the rest insured by
commercial carriers.88 The pooling figure is higher for cities than for
counties.89 And the largest municipalities—the big cities and counties,
with over 500,000 or 750,000 residents—self-insure.90 In its ideal form,
self-insurance is not the same as simply “going bare.” Self-insurance
involves setting aside an amount of money, calculated much like a
premium, sufficient to cover future potential losses, and engaging in
proactive risk management just like insurers encourage their
policyholders to do.91 (Indeed, many sophisticated pools are actually
self-insured cooperatives even though, in operation, they look much like
commercial insurers.)
Some self-insured municipalities, however,
engage in little risk management and finance liability obligations on a
A, supra note 61; Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer B (Aug. 21, 2014);
Telephone Interview with Consultant A (Aug. 27, 2014).
87 See Judy Greenwald, Pros and Cons Seen in Municipal Pools; Some Risk
Managers Prefer To Control Own Destiny, BUS. INS., May 16, 1994, at 6; Telephone
Interview with Commercial Broker A (June 23, 2015) (asserting that pools
comprise predominantly towns under 100,000); Young, supra note 77, at 1068
(asserting that 94% of pool participants are under 10,000 in population, and the
rest are under 100,000). But see Schwartz, How Governments Pay, supra note 10,
at 13 (asserting that municipalities under 100,000 are covered by pools or
commercial insurers); Public Entity Insurance Program, supra note 9 (marketing
commercial covearge exclusively to towns under 100,000).
88 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D (Oct. 9, 2014) (estimating
that municipalities below 750,000 insure 70% in pools, 10% with commercial
carriers, and 20% with commercial coverage purchased through a trade association
program). But see Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86
(responding that 70% estimate is too high); see also SYDNEY CRESSWELL & MICHAEL
LANDON-MURRAY, TAKING MUNICIPALITIES TO COURT 3 (2013) (reporting that, as of
2013, roughly 40% of New York municipalities were members of statewide pool).
89 Telephone Interview with Trade Association A (Sept. 15, 2014).
90 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 88 (estimating
that municipalities over 750,000 typically self-insure); Telephone Interview with
Commercial Broker A, supra note 87 (over 500,000). But see Schwartz, How, supra
note 10, at 13 (over 100,000 self-insure). See generally ICMA Report, supra note
83, at 13 (providing data showing proportion of public entities of various sizes that
purchased police liability insurance in 1991, and concluding that “[t]he larger the
public entity, the more likely it is self insured”); Louis P. Vitullo & Scott J. Peters,
Intergovernmental Cooperation and the Municipal Insurance Crisis, 30 DEPAUL L.
REV. 325, 336 (1981) (explaining why self-insurance is practical for only the largest
entities).
91 See RYNARD, supra note 46, § 31.04.

23

pay-as-you-go basis. For present purposes, I refer to all municipalities
that decline to purchase primary coverage on the market (i.e., from
either a commercial carrier or a pool) as self-insured, but when
contrasting market insurance with self-insurance, it is worth bearing in
mind that self-insurance encompasses a range of philosophies toward
managing risk.92
Numerous factors inform a municipality’s choice of how to insure.
Running through some of them briefly here serves two purposes. First,
my basic argument—that insurers can effect change within police
agencies—depends on establishing that municipalities respond to
insurers’ incentives. This becomes more plausible with the recognition
that municipalities have preferences, sometimes strong ones, about
their choice of insurance mechanism. When an insurer threatens to
terminate coverage, or gestures in that direction, municipalities often
bend to preserve their preferred arrangement. Second, and relatedly,
flagging the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the various
insurance mechanisms identifies correlative advantages and
disadvantages of potential legal interventions in the marketplace. For
example, if many municipalities favor self-insurance because of the
greater autonomy it affords, then policymakers can expect objections to
a market-insurance mandate on autonomy grounds.
Prior scholarship has explored the choice set consumers confront in
other insurance market contexts.93 In order to tailor the discussion to
our context, I rely here largely on the views of the industry experts with
whom I spoke, supplemented with citation to trade and academic
literature.94
Pricing. The experts I interviewed agreed that municipalities, like
most consumers, consider pricing when deciding how to insure. One
even suggested that price can be a municipality’s primary or sole

92 Steven Waldman et al., The Surge in Self-Insurance, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7,
1988, at 74 (describing good and bad forms of self-insurance); see also Telephone
Interview with Commercial Insurer E (July 23, 2015) (opining that some selfinsureds have good risk management and adequate capitalization, but others do
not).
93 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 17, at 314-45 (comparing self-insurance, contract
insurance, and market insurance); Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market
Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972); Henry
Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Companies: Mutual Versus Stock, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 125 (1985).
94 For an overview of the tradeoffs a municipality faces when choosing between
a pool and commercial insurance, including some points not mentioned here, see
Thomas W. Rynard, The Local Government as Insured or Insurer: Some New Risk
Management Alternatives, 20 URB. LAW. 103, 148-52 (1988).
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consideration.95 Under frequently prevailing market conditions, pools
can offer lower prices because they skim no profit from the
contributions they collect.96 The spread between a pool contribution
and a commercial carrier’s premium might be 10 to 20%.97 Others
observed, however, that municipalities sometimes leave pools after
being enticed by commercial carriers’ lower prices;98 this is especially
likely during a soft market, when commercial carriers compete heavily
to get their hands on premium dollars. Pools’ prices are more
provisional, too; a pool that fails to collect sufficient contributions to
cover losses may require a special, retroactive contribution, which
commercial carriers will not do.99
It is tempting to assume that self-insurance is less expensive than
market coverage, but this is not necessarily the case. “Even if the
premium charged to each member of [a market insurance] pool is
slightly greater than the true expected loss, it is still less than the cost
of self-insurance, because self-insurance necessarily requires taking
into account a greater range of possible outcomes.”100 Market insurance
also creates certain cost-saving economies of scale.
Specialization. Pools, I was frequently told, are more specialized
and more familiar with municipalities and policing risk than
commercial carriers are. 101 Some pools have policing specialists on
E.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34;
Telephone Interview with Consultant B (Aug. 16, 2014); see also 2005 COST OF RISK
SURVEY, supra note 8, at 7 (reporting that “seeking competitive insurance through
insurance carriers or pooling arrangements” was the most common measure used
to reduce the cost of risk in a national survey). State tax law may affect the aftertax prices of the different insurance options. Telephone Interview with Trade
Association A, supra note 89.
96 E.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34; see also
Roberto Ceniceros, Market Conditions Putting Squeeze on Public Entities, BUS.
INS., June 11, 2001, at 10 (describing municipalities that join pools to escape rising
commercial rates); Meg Fletcher, Public Entities Plunge into Self-Insurance Pools,
BUS. INS., July 15, 1985, at 3, 25.
97 Young, supra note 77, at 1069.
98 Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86.
99 Id.; see Rynard, supra note 94, at 127 (explaining why, “over the long run,
the local government may not realize any cost savings by risk pooling”).
100 Priest, supra note 40, at 1543; see also SYDNEY CRESSWELL & MICHAEL
LANDON-MURRAY, ASSESSING THE FISCAL IMPACT OF LAWSUITS ON NEW YORK STATE
MUNICIPALITIES 4-5 (2011) (discussing expenses incurred by self-insured
municipalities).
101 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G (Sept. 9, 2014); Telephone
Interview with Commercial Insurer H (Aug. 27, 2014) (does not focus loss
prevention on operational details of policing, but rather general risk-management
principles); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool C (July 6, 2015).
95
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staff, who are typically former officers.102 But so do some commercial
carriers, especially those that market themselves as public-entity
experts.103 So while the average pool may be more specialized than the
average commercial carrier, there is expertise to be found in both
segments of the market.
Relationships. Many pools, experts told me, function like an
extension of the municipalities that make them up. 104 Member
municipalities regard the pool as their business partner and resource
rather than an authoritarian figure telling them “thou shalt not do
this.”105 Pools are reputedly less likely to settle litigation against the
police, which is viewed as a sign of loyalty and commitment to their
members.106 And unlike commercial insurers, which come and go from
the market as they ride the insurance cycle, pools are there “through
thick and thin.”107 Pools also foster collective efficacy and responsibility
among their members—high-performing members can communicate
with and encourage troubled municipalities to take loss-prevention
more seriously.108
102 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 85; Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85; Telephone Interview with Risk Pool C,
supra note 101.
103 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61;
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101; Telephone
Interview with Commercial Broker A, supra note 87; see Doucette, supra note 77,
at 547.
104 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Trade Association A, supra note 89;
NIXON, supra note 77, at 15 (“One of the fundamental advantages of pools is that
they know their members.”).
105 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D (Sept. 2, 2014).
106 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105.
Ronen
Avraham identifies the insurer’s motivation to settle claims the insured would
want to litigate as a type of “reverse moral hazard.” Avraham, supra note 40, at
90; see Patricia M. Danzon, Liability and Liability Insurance for Medical
Malpractice, 4 J. HEALTH ECON. 309, 319-20 (1985).
107 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34; see
Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA.
L. REV. 85, 101-03 (2001) (describing how the insurance crisis turned “[w]hat was
once a cooperative relationship” between commercial insurers and their
policyholders “into an adversarial one”).
108 Telephone Interview with Consultant B, supra note 95; see also Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105 (acknowledging this dynamic but
characterizing it as rare); Greenwald, supra note 87, at 6; Waldman et al., supra
note 92 (“[P]eer pressure is a powerful goad to efficiency.”); cf. Cohen, supra note
17, at 340 (“Mutuals trade off the costs of reduced diversification [relative to stock
insurers] against the benefits of improved loss prevention. Mutuals can … enhance
compliance with loss prevention measures by having their members monitor each
other.” (footnote omitted)); Hansmann, supra note 93, at 148 (similar).
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One expert suggested that, precisely because they are an extension
of local government entities, pools also may be more effective than
commercial carriers at lobbying state government on their members’
behalf. 109 Commercial carriers can compete along this dimension,
however, by contracting with local agents familiar with hometown
politics. In fact, one expert speculated that some towns may choose
commercial insurance for patronage purposes, in order to support local
industry.110
Loss-prevention services. Consistent with the previous point, pools
are often said to work more closely with municipalities to implement
proactive loss-prevention programs. 111
Pools allow smaller
municipalities to coordinate and leverage economies of scale to
purchase loss-prevention services they otherwise could not afford.112
They may also help to overcome free-rider problems and other economic
disincentives to the development of new loss-prevention strategies by
municipalities and commercial insurers.113 One expert told me that
pools spend more of every dollar on loss prevention: 2-4 cents versus
commercial carriers’ 0.75-1.114 Still, I was reminded several times that
the quality of pools, and their loss-prevention services, varies widely.115
And “[d]ue to budget constraints, pools may not be aware of some of the
more robust risk management database systems available that include
options such as predictive modeling and warehousing.”116
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 93.
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61; Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool C, supra note 101.
111 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101;
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer I (Apr. 18, 2014); Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool C, supra note 101; Telephone Interview with Risk Pool E
(Sept. 2, 2014); Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86; cf. CAROL A.
HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION 50-51, 61-66 (1985) (describing how,
historically, mutual fire insurance companies emphasized loss prevention, while
stock (commercial) insurers emphasized loss-spreading instead); Hansmann, supra
note 93, at 147-48 (arguing that conflicts of interest and free-rider problems
disadvantage stock insurers relative to mutuals in researching and implementing
loss-prevention measures).
112 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34; see CAROL
A. ARCHBOLD, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND LEGAL ADVISING 51
(2004) (describing how insurance agents and risk assessors can provide riskmanagement services to smaller municipalities that cannot finance a dedicated
risk manager); Esenberg, supra note 34, at 74 (similar).
113 See HEIMER, supra note 93, at 64-66; SUGARMAN, supra note 24, at 16.
114 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer C (Aug. 18, 2014).
115 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer E, supra note 92; Telephone
Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34.
116 NIXON, supra note 77, at 12.
109
110
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At the opposite end of the spectrum, the corporate literature
suggests that the largest entities may benefit little from insurers’ lossprevention services, as they are more likely to have their own riskmanagement departments and sophisticated information bases.117 This
may drive down demand for external insurance mechanisms among
these entities. The extent to which this insight translates to the
municipal context, however, is unclear.118
Financial stability. A few experts noted that commercial carriers
may be better capitalized and more financially stable than pools; they’re
also more closely regulated. 119 Commercial insurers are better
diversified because their pools of risk are larger and draw from different
industries and locales. One member with a run of big claims could
threaten a pool’s existence or, at the least, lead the pool to levy special
assessments on the other members to cover the losses.120 The experts
recalled examples of pools that had folded under financial strain.121 Of
course, this can and has happened to commercial carriers as well.122
Commercial carriers are also thought to be more vulnerable than pools

ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 233.
See ARCHBOLD, supra note 112, at 25 (asserting that internal riskmanagement programs “are still in the infancy stage of being embraced by police
agencies”); G. PATRICK GALLAGHER, SUCCESSFUL POLICE RISK MANAGEMENT 10-15
(2014) (describing the “absence of emphasis on risk management” as a “glaring
deficiency” in police leadership).
119 E.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61; see
also NIXON, supra note 77, at 15.
120 E.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101;
Telephone Interview with Commercial Broker B, supra note 36; see Greenwald,
supra note 87, at 6. Because all of a pool’s member municipalities are in the same
state, moreover, unfavorable changes in state law can create a highly correlated
risk. See Jan M. Ambrose et al., The Economics of Liability Insurance, in
HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 315, 325 (G. Dionne ed., 2d ed. 2013) (explaining that
changes in legal precedent can influence many claims simultaneously and in the
same direction).
121 E.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101; see
also NIXON, supra note 77, at 9 (reporting that pool managers surveyed recently
raised concerns about “[p]otential pool insolvency”); Baurkot, supra note 77, at 45
(“A.M. Best believes … that a number of smaller pools may be in financial trouble
as competitive pressures make it difficult for them to operate profitably.”);
Doucette, supra note 77, at 543 (discussing some pools’ “solvency problems”);
Waldman et al., supra note 92 (reporting that a large Michigan pool was
underfunded by around $21.5 million).
122 CRESSWELL & LANDON-MURRAY, supra note 100, at 40 (“Officials told stories
of A-rated insurers … that suddenly collapsed, leaving municipalities without
coverage and with exposure for all existing claims.”).
117
118
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to the pendulum swings of the insurance cycle.123 Financial stability is
almost certainly one reason that all of the self-insured municipalities
are large—their broad tax bases and big budgets allow them to absorb
the shock of large judgments and settlements that might seriously
damage a smaller city.124
Alternatives. Not all municipalities will confront the same choice set
when deciding how to insure. Some municipalities, for example, carry
commercial coverage because there were no available pooling options—
or none of adequate quality—or because they were kicked out of a
pool.125 The City of Pacific, Washington, for example, was reportedly
expelled from its pool in 2012 due to unstable (and thus risky)
governance. It was forced to obtain much more expensive coverage on
the commercial market.
After changes in the City’s executive
leadership, the pool readmitted Pacific on probationary status.126
Autonomy.
Some municipalities prefer commercial coverage
because commercial carriers, which may tend to be less aggressive
about loss prevention, leave them greater autonomy over their policing
operations.127 Self-insurance buys even greater autonomy still.128 Selfinsurance also preserves municipal control over litigation defense, given
that external insurers typically insist on the right to defend and settle
litigation.129
2. The Pervasiveness of Private Influence
I promised early on to show how police liability insurance inverts
the ordinary model of governance as public regulation of private actors.
Here, I said, it is the private actors that regulate the public ones. Yet I
just described a market in which the majority of municipalities insure
123 NIXON, supra note 77, at 11; Ceniceros, supra note 96, at 10 (describing how
pools build up reserves to hedge against market conditions); Don Jones, Nat’l
League of Cities, in ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOV’TAL RELATIONS, STAFF INFO.
REP. SR-7, GOVERNMENTS AT RISK: LIABILITY INSURANCE AND TORT REFORM (1987).
But see Rynard, supra note 94 at 127 (“The risk pool is subject to the same cyclical
patterns as the commercial insurers ….”).
124 See Schwartz, How Governments Pay, supra note 10, at 18-19 (discussing
how smaller jurisdictions “feel the financial effects of lawsuits more acutely”).
125 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool E, supra note 111; Telephone Interview
with Consultant A, supra note 86; Telephone Interview with G. Patrick Gallagher
(Aug. 20, 2014).
126 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool E, supra note 111.
127 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer H, supra note 101.
128 See Greenwald, supra note 87, at 6.
129 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61;
Telephone Interview with City Counsel A (June 25, 2015).
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with intergovernmental risk pools rather than commercial carriers.
Substantiating my initial claim, and showing that it describes more
than some small, aberrational corner of the market, therefore requires
more work, to which I turn now. A slew of private parties, I will
explain, exert influence over the police even in municipalities that selfinsure or obtain coverage through a pool. I introduce these actors
briefly in this section and then detail their involvement in Part II,
where I cover insurers’ loss-prevention techniques.
First, some pools, while public in formal structure and outward
appearance, in fact are dominated by private personnel. 130
“Historically, pools have relied heavily on third-party providers to
supply services” such as underwriting, loss prevention, and legal
counsel.131 For example, the Ohio Municipal Joint Self-Insurance Pool
is an unincorporated, statutory, tax-exempt risk-sharing system for
Ohio municipalities.132 All of the day-to-day management of the pool,
however, is conducted by the JWF Specialty Company in Indiana, a
subsidiary of Old National Insurance. 133 Likewise, the League of
Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust contracts with Berkley Risk for
underwriting and claims management.134 Berkley Risk is a subsidiary
of W.R. Berkley Company, a commercial insurer.135 Berkley Risk staff
are fully integrated into the pool’s operation. In fact, one pool executive
claimed not to know whether some of his colleagues work for one or the
other entity. Berkley Risk employees have two sets of business cards
and two sets of bosses.136 By one account, roughly 35% of pools are
staffed this way.137
130 See Rodd Zolkos, Individual Pools Make Their Own Future: Panel Advises
Municipal Self-Insurance Pools To Meet Members’ Needs, BUS. INS., June 22, 1998,
at 13 (“[S]ome pools have become so controlled by the insurance companies or other
service contractors with which they do business that they’ve lost touch with local
government.”).
131 Young, supra note 77, at 1067; see also id. at 1068 (noting that, in some
pools, “management has been completely outsourced”).
132 About Us, OHIO MUN. JOINT SELF-INS. POOL, http://www.omjsp.com/
aboutus.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
133 Id.; Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61; About
Us, JWF SPECIALTY CO., https://www.oldnationalins.com/jwf-specialty/about-us.asp
(last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
134 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 85.
135 About, BERKLEY RISK, https://www.berkleyrisk.com/Pages/About.aspx (last
visited Aug. 31, 2015).
136 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 85; see also About Us,
WIS. CTY. MUT. INS. CO., http://www.wisconsincountymutual.org/about-us.html
(last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (identifying pool’s private general administrator); Risk
Management Services, IND. MUN. INS. PROGRAM, http://www.indianamip.com/
services.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (describing risk-management services
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Even when pools have their own independent staffs, many rely
heavily on consultants and vendors from the private sector to
implement their loss-prevention programs. 138 The most prominent
consultants are retired police officers, including retired chiefs, who are
retained to write or review departmental policies, conduct risk audits,
or train officers on high-risk operations. One consultant told me about
a telephone hotline, staffed by consultants, that pools can call for advice
on challenging issues like the use of drones.139 These consultants help
bridge the cultural gap that separates insurers from police; they
understand risk management but speak police vernacular.140
Second, the coverage I have described so far is only one of what are
typically several layers of protection. Pools limit the amount of police
liability they will cover, and even self-insured municipalities do not
retain all of their risk. Indeed, what I have casually described as selfinsured municipalities are really mostly municipalities with substantial
self-insured retentions. That is, these municipalities commit to manage
and finance their own risk up to a certain defined level. Both pools and
self-insured municipalities typically contract—and sometimes are
required by law to contract—with reinsurance carriers.141 Reinsurance

provided by private pool administrator on behalf of commercial carrier for pool
members); Haggerty, supra note 85 (describing a California city that “started its
own insurance company,” to be managed by a commercial servicer that would
“provide or contract for all essential insurance company operations and services,
including underwriting, actuarial, claims, loss prevention, reinsurance, accounting,
statistical and state filing” and marketed by another private servicer).
137 NIXON, supra note 77, at 3.
138 See, e.g., CIRMAT, INC., http://www.sashley.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2015)
(advertising “consulting in risk management and training,” including “Police
Deadly Force Consultation,” “Policy Review & Development,” “Law Enforcement
Training,” and other services); LAAW INT’L, INC., http://laaw.us (last visited Jul. 20,
2015) (offering “Supervisory Audits” and “Law Enforcement Training”); Services,
RUSSELL CONSULTING, LLC, http://russell-consulting.org/services/ (last visited Aug.
31, 2015) (listing “Management” and “Evidence Room Audits,” assistance with
selection of an interim chief of police, and on-site training in “Verbal Judo” and
“Active Shooter Response”); SKIDCAR SYS., http://www.skidcar.com (last visited
Aug. 31, 2015).
139 Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86.
140 See Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101; see
also Roberto Ceniceros, Formal Risk Management Growing in Law Enforcement,
BUS. INS., Aug. 10, 1998 (reporting officer’s view that “[e]ffective risk management
in law enforcement takes an insider to do the job well”).
141 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40M, § 4(B)(1) (requiring pools to purchase
excess insurance); see also Young, supra note 77, at 1069 (“[P]ools have begun to
purchase more commercial insurance ….”).
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is insurance for insurance companies.142 For example, a pool might
retain the first $500,000 of risk and purchase excess of loss insurance
from a reinsurer that kicks in when one of its members incurs a loss
that surpasses that point.143
Some of these reinsurers are also public creations, like NLC Mutual
Insurance Company, a member-owned reinsurer that brings together
twenty-eight risk pools sponsored by the National League of Cities.144
Yet, according to the executive director of a leading trade association, it
is “universally true” that commercial insurers are somewhere in the
picture. 145 Commercial insurance might be “behind” the public
reinsurance—NLC Mutual reportedly reinsures with Lloyds of London
and Willis Re.146 Or it might be “above” the public reinsurance. For
example, Citycounty Insurance Services (CIS), an Oregon pool, issues
coverage to its members with a $5 million cap. CIS retains the first
$500,000 of risk on most of its lines of coverage. It provides the next
layer of coverage, from $500,000 to $2 million, by purchasing
reinsurance from the Oregon Public Entity Excess Pool, a public
creation. And from $2 million and up, CIS reinsures with companies
like Lloyd’s of London and Munich Re.147
Reinsurers do not typically manage municipal risk directly. But
they vet insurers and pools to make sure that they are attending to loss
prevention, and they price the aggregate risk accordingly.148 In doing
so, they exert a regulatory force: “As I have observed and worked with
pools the past 34 years,” one industry expert recalled, “I came to the
realization that reinsurers do in fact ‘call the shots’ for the vast
142 For an introduction to reinsurance principles, see Aviva Abramovsky,
Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 350-55 (2009), or
Mendoza, supra note 77, at 63-67. The reinsurance pools purchase is typically (if
not always) “treaty reinsurance,” in which the pool cedes to the reinsurer a portion
of an entire line of business, rather than “facultative reinsurance,” in which a pool
purchases reinsurance for a specific risk. See Mendoza, supra note 77, at 65.
143 See Abramovsky, supra note 142, at 364-65; see also Telephone Interview
with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34 (estimating average pool retention at
$500,000). There are frequently additional layers above the first layer of
reinsurance as well. See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 15, at 53-54 (describing
“towered” structure of insurance policies).
144 NLC MUT. INS. CO., https://www.nlcmutual.com/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2015);
see also About Us, CTY. REINSURANCE LTD., http://www.countyreinsurance.org/#/
about-us (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
145 Telephone Interview with Trade Association A, supra note 89.
146 Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86.
147 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85.
148 Telephone Interview with Trade Association A, supra note 89; see Mendoza,
supra note 77, at 125 (“It is critical for the reinsurer to know the pool is proactive
in risk management ….” (quoting pool official) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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majority of pools.” 149 At bottom, although pools and commercial
insurers are competitors in the market for primary coverage, they are
nonetheless tightly intertwined in reinsurance relationships that
experts describe as “mutually dependent” and “symbiotic.”150
Third, insurers frequently outsource risk management to private
organizations. The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies, or CALEA, is the name most frequently uttered. CALEA is
an independent, nonprofit corporation with a professional staff and a
board that includes members from business and academia along with
law enforcement.151 CALEA audits and certifies agencies that have met
specified risk-management criteria; insurers either fund the
accreditation process or reward agencies that have completed it.152
Finally, in at least some cases, credit rating agencies are involved as
well. In 1998, ratings agency A.M. Best, referring to pools, reported
that it had “rated a number of public entity-like insurance companies
since the early 1990s.” 153 Standard and Poor’s rates the Texas
Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool.
As part of its
operations report to the ratings agency, the pool recently touted its lossprevention initiatives, including details about police training in the use
of force and high-stress decisionmaking.154 One expert estimated that
“two handfuls” of pools are rated in this way.155 The rating signals
stability and security to a pool’s current and potential members,
especially in states in which the pools are lightly regulated; one pool, I

149 Mendoza, supra note 77, at 101 (quoting former senior official from the
Association of Governmental Risk Pools) (internal quotation markets omitted).
150 Id. at 116, 124 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Telephone
Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101.
151 The Commission, CALEA, http://www.calea.org/content/commission (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015).
152 See infra text accompanying notes 235-240. The accreditation agencies, at
least in theory, may in turn be subject to tort liability for failing to take reasonable
care in setting private regulatory standards. See Peter H. Schuck, Tort Liability to
Those Injured by Negligent Accreditation Decisions, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185
(1994).
153 Baurkot, supra note 77, at 45.
154 Report
to Standard & Poor’s on the Texas Municipal League
Intergovernmental Risk Pool’s Structure, Operations and Initiatives (Jan. 26,
2015), http://www.tmlirp.org/filestore/fin/SandP/sandp2014narrative.pdf
155 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34.
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was told, lost members when its credit rating went down.156 The credit
rating also likely affects reinsurance pricing.157
D. The Typical Terms of Coverage
It may be helpful at this point to walk through some of the pertinent
provisions of a typical police liability policy.158 Increasingly, the police
policy is part of a commercial general liability policy purchased by the
municipality, although stand-alone police policies, called “monoline”
policies, do still exist.159
The municipality is the “named” or “primary” insured under the
policy; all of the municipality’s police officers are additional insureds.
In the basic coverage provision, the insurer agrees, subject to certain
limits, to “pay on behalf of the insured all ‘loss’ resulting from ‘law
enforcement wrongful act(s)’ which arise out of and are committed
during the course and scope of ‘law enforcement activities.”160 Covered
loss includes punitive damages (where law permits) unless they are

156 Id.; cf. Harry F. Brooks, Public Entity Risk Management and Insurance—
Part V, AM. AGENT & BROKER, May 1992, at 12, 12 (advising agents and brokers to
examine financial, actuarial, and reinsurance arrangements of unregulated pools).
157 See Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61
(agreeing that this pricing effect seems likely, though disclaiming personal
knowledge).
158 On the standardization of insurance forms, including possible movement
away from the standardization norm, see Avraham, supra note 40, at 96-98; see
also Abraham, supra note 40, at 656 (stating that “virtually all property-casualty
insurance policies … are standard-forms used by most insurers”).
159 Compare Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34
(has written police liability only as part of commercial general liability for the past
10 years), with Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101
(still writes some monoline policies).
160 In the text I quote language from a sample commercial policy.
Law
Enforcement Liability Coverage Form, Nat’l Cas. Co. 1, http://euclidps.com/2/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/Law_Enforcement_II_PE_PL_2_0802.pdf. The terms of a
pool’s coverage memorandum are quite similar. See, e.g., Liability Coverage
Document, Tex. Mun. League Intergov’tal Risk Pool 9 (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://www.tmlirp.org/sites/default/files/docs/Liability%2010-1-14.pdf.
For
additional examples, see Am. Safety Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 776 F.
Supp. 2d 670, 684-85, 688, 689 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co. v. City
of Council Bluffs, 755 F. Supp. 2d 988, 998, 1004-05 (S.D. Iowa 2010); N. River Ins.
Co. v. Broward Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2006);
Coregis Ins. Co. v. City of Harrisburg, No. 1:03-CV-920, 2006 WL 860710, at *2
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2006); Nat’l Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 515 N.Y.S.2d
267, 268-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); City of Lee’s Summit v. Mo. Pub. Entity Risk
Mgmt., 390 S.W.3d 214, 218 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
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explicitly excluded. 161 “Law enforcement activities” simply means
“[t]hose activities conducted by” the municipality’s law enforcement
agency.162 A “law enforcement wrongful act” is “any actual or alleged
act, error or omission, neglect or breach of duty by the insured while
conducting ‘law enforcement activities’ which results in: a. ‘personal
injury’; b. ‘bodily injury’; or c. ‘property damage.’”163 The meat of the
policy is found in the definition of “personal injury.”164 The sample
policy I quote here defines “personal injury” to include “[a]ssault and
battery,” [d]iscrimination, unless insurance thereof is prohibited by
law,” “[f]alse arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious
prosecution,” “[h]umiliation or mental distress,” “[v]iolation of civil
rights protected under 42 USC 1981 et sequential or State law,”
“[v]iolation of property rights,” and “[w]rongful entry, eviction or other
invasion of the right of public occupancy.”165
The policy excludes any claim made against the insured “[a]rising
out of the deliberate violation of any federal, state, or local” law
“committed by or with the knowledge and consent of the insured” where
liability results. 166 It also excludes any claim “[b]rought about or
contributed to by fraud, dishonesty, bad faith or malicious act(s) of an
insured.”167 The exclusions are read from the viewpoint of each insured.
This means that, if an officer is found to have deliberately violated the
law or acted maliciously, he will not be covered;168 the municipality,
however, will still be covered unless it knew about and consented to the

161 Darrell Child, Law Enforcement Liability: A Specialty-Market Risk, AM.
AGENT & BROKER, Apr. 1995, at 32. On the insurability of punitive damages, see
George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1009, 1020-22
(1989).
162 Nat’l Cas. Co., supra note 160, at 5.
163 Id.
164 See Harry F. Brooks, Public Entity Risk Management—Part VII, AM. AGENT
& BROKER, May 1994, at 22, 22; Child, supra note 161 at 29, 30.
165 Nat’l Cas. Co., supra note 160, at 5-6. For opinions upholding insurance
policy provisions covering compensatory and punitive damages for discrimination
and other willful misconduct, see Dixon Distrib. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 612
N.E.2d 846, 855-57 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993); Colson v. Lloyd’s of London, 435 S.W.2d 42,
47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Am. Mgmt. Ass’n v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 802,
808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). But see Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of
Hempstead, 397 N.E.2d 737, 744 (N.Y. 1979) (proscribing coverage of punitive
damages for civil rights violations); City of Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 342 A.2d 513, 518 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (same, in dicta).
166 Nat’l Cas. Co., supra note 160, at 2.
167 Id.
168 For an explanation of why insurance policies typically exclude intentional
acts, see Priest, supra note 77, at 1023-26.
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officer’s conduct.169 And the municipality may still decide to indemnify
the officer for any damages levied upon him.170 I was told that, in
practice, police liability policies are understood to be broad and that the
policy exclusions are not especially relevant to practitioners.171
II. HOW INSURERS REGULATE THE POLICE
With the basic concepts and cast of characters in place, this Part
details how exactly it is that insurers regulate the police. In Section A,
I describe the various loss-prevention techniques insurers employ in an
effort to reduce the number and magnitude of police-inflicted harms. In
Section B, I explain how insurers use the underwriting process to create
incentives for police agencies to cooperate with those loss-prevention
initiatives. That is the basic, two-part structure of regulation-byinsurance: loss prevention backed by underwriting incentives.172 I then
discuss the regulatory role of reinsurers in Section C. Section D shows
how my findings contribute to the debate over the uncertain effects of
“making governments pay.” Throughout Part II, I highlight some of the
features that make regulation-by-insurance in this setting not only
practically but also theoretically significant. In particular, when
insurers regulate the police, they construe, enforce, and transform
constitutional principles, stretching prevailing understandings of who
interprets our Constitution.
A. Loss Prevention
Loss prevention, as I use the term, is a broad concept encompassing
all of an insurer’s efforts to convey to an insured municipality—either
directly or through a third party—information intended to help reduce
169 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61; see also
KEETON, supra note 81, §5.4(b), at 292-93 (“[I]t is not enough to preclude coverage
for a named or additional insured of a policy that the harm was intentionally
caused from the point of view of another named or additional insured of the same
policy.”); James A. Fischer, The Exclusion from Insurance Coverage of Losses
Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured: A Policy in Search of a Justification,
30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 148 (1990); Mary Coate McNeely, Illegality as a Factor
in Insurance, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 26, 43 (1941).
170 See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 923-25 (finding that municipalities
indemnify officers in these circumstances).
171 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61.
172 See HEIMER, supra note 93, at 28 (arguing that insurers must always couple
underwriting with loss prevention and that “[n]either tactic will work alone”); id. at
63 (“And though much advice was only advice, policyholders might be required to
pay higher premiums if they disregarded the advice and therefore increased risk.”).
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the incidence and magnitude of covered harms. Insurers work with
municipalities on loss prevention throughout the life of the coverage
relationship, often communicating frequently. I have sorted insurers’
loss-prevention techniques into five buckets: policy development,
education and training, audits, accreditation, and personnel. There are
some loss-prevention measures that do not fit comfortably into any of
my categories. Some insurers, for example, encourage community
outreach efforts like “Coffee with a Cop” in the hope of improving policecommunity relations and reducing harmful occurrences.173 Still, the
five categories that follow capture the bulk of the strategies insurers
told me they use to prevent and mitigate loss.
1. Policy Development
There can be little doubt that insurers influence the content of
police policies and procedures. According to one commentator, in fact,
the “most important reason” that litigation against municipalities has
been “powerful as an accountability device” is that “insurance
companies [have] demanded that police improve their policies and
practices in adherence to constitutional requirements and thus avoid
monetary payouts to injured citizens.”174 Insurers prioritize policies on
certain high-risk matters such as the use of force, vehicle “hot” pursuit,
domestic violence, and the handling of intoxicated or mentally ill
individuals.175
Insurers shape these policies in several ways. First, some insurers
review and provide suggestions on agency policies, or retain a
consultant to do the same.176 Insurers’ feedback can range from small

See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105; COFFEE
COP, http://coffeewithacop.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2015); see also Kate
Zernike, Camden Turns Around with New Police Force, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2014,
at A1 (describing community outreach efforts in Camden).
174 Candace McCoy, How Civil Rights Lawsuits Improve American Policing, in
HOLDING POLICE ACCOUNTABLE 111, 112 (Candace McCoy ed., 2010); see also
HEIMER, supra note 93, at 24 (describing insurers’ insight that, to control their
agents, policyholders must establish routines that make it hard for their agents to
deviate).
175
See,
e.g.,
Law
Enforcement
Liability
Application,
CNA,
https://www.oldnationalins.com/pdfs/Insurance/JWF-Applications/LawEnforcement-Liability-Application.pdf.
176 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Consultant B, supra note 95; Child,
supra note 161, at 32-33.
173

WITH A
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tweaks to substantial policy recommendations. 177 Policing expert
Samuel Walker has argued that, “[o]f all the roles and activities that
oversight agencies can play, policy review is the one most likely to
produce organizational change and thereby achieve long-term
improvements in policing.”178 Walker was writing about oversight by
citizen groups, not insurers, but the basic point still holds.
The policy-review process is one of the places one can see legal
norms subtly change form in insurers’ hands.
One insurer I
interviewed insisted that her firm reviews agency policies only from a
“risk-management perspective,” not a legal one.179 But, of course, the
“risk” being managed here is the risk of legal liability, i.e., the risk that
the law will be broken and damages due. I am skeptical that the
concepts of “legal” and “risk management” can be disentangled so
cleanly. An insurer assessing whether an agency policy adequately
manages risk—i.e., the risk of legal liability—would be hard-pressed
not to form and convey an opinion about what the law requires. If I am
right, by taking a “risk-management perspective,” most insurers will
not avoid legal judgment at all, but will instead recast the law in a
“nonlegal risk logic” that strips it of its moral valence.180
The second way insurers shape police policy is by furnishing fully
formed model policies and procedures, or detailed guidelines for their
promulgation. 181 Again, outside consultants often do the legwork,
sometimes bundling the provision of policies with training on policy
content. 182 Model policy development entails more than simply
regurgitating commands from statutes and constitutional rulings.
Insurers, for example, take positions on form in addition to substance:
one insurer’s guidelines advise municipalities to “[i]nclude a ‘limited’
number of ‘standards’” (as opposed to “rules”) in their use-of-force

177 See, e.g., Travelers Ins., supra note 31 (“In general, Travelers advises law
enforcement agencies and detention facility administrators to avoid blanket strip
search practices.”).
178 SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT
93 (2001).
179 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer E, supra note 92.
180 Talesh, supra note 20, at 211.
181 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34; Travelers
Ins., Cutting Law Enforcement Training—A Costly Choice, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(Nov. 2011), https://www.travelers.com/iwcm/Distribution/2010/11_November/PSS/
4.html (advertising provision of “a CD-ROM of law enforcement policies”).
182 Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86; see also Telephone
Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 88 (provides access to a law
firm’s website that contains model policies and procedures).
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policies.183 And insurers encourage police attention to issues that likely
relate to liability but are typically thought to fall outside the law’s
ambit, such as including a psychological-testing requirement in a hiring
policy.184
Finally, some insurers fund or subsidize subscriptions to a turnkey
policy-writing service from a company called Lexipol.185 Founded in
2002, Lexipol provides customizable, state-specific policy content for
police agencies. The company employs a team of “legal and public
safety professionals” that “constantly monitor[s] and review[s]
government legislation and case decisions” to keep the policies up to
date.186 The service also includes an integrated training component—
daily training bulletins at roll call present officers with “real-life,
scenario-based training exercises emphasizing high-risk, low-frequency
events.”187 Officer participation is verifiable.188 I spoke with one of the
founders of Lexipol, an attorney and 33-year police veteran. He recalled
having shopped the Lexipol concept unsuccessfully with police chiefs in
the 1990s. The idea took off, he explained, only after it caught the eye
of police liability insurers.189
2. Education and Training
A “widely held assumption about the insurance industry” is that
“insurers have expertise in acquiring and sorting sophisticated

183 Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies & Procedures: Use of Force Policy
Elements, Trident Ins. Servs. (July 2012), https://www.argolimited.com/media/
03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/9a5e44de9e07465726bcb14894240b67ba9c4565/
5PLYTFCP9D5H/Trident-LEL-Use-of-Force-Policy-Elements-2012.pdf.
184 Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies & Procedures: Law Enforcement
Employment
Hiring
Policy,
Trident
Ins.
Servs.
(July
2012),
https://www.argolimited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/
10f723258ac7d261004bd82fd2e6bb887c04bd54/7OC1HCX5Y526/Trident-LELEmployment-Hiring-Policy-2012.pdf.
185 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85 (heavily subsidizes
Lexipol subscription); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105
(provides subscription outright).
186 Law Enforcement Custom Policy Content, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/
law-enforcement (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
187
Law
Enforcement
Daily
Training
Bulletins,
LEXIPOL,
http://www.lexipol.com/law-enforcement/#horizontalTab2 (last visited Aug. 31,
2015).
188 Id.; see also David Lesh, A Blueprint for Reducing Lawsuits Against Police,
PUB. RISK, Aug. 2002, at 14, 16.
189 Telephone Interview with Gordon Graham (Aug. 29, 2014).
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information.”190 This makes police insurers a natural clearinghouse for
information about breaking developments in the law as well as new
technologies and training strategies with loss-reducing potential.191
Insurers use a multi-pronged attack to convey this information to
municipalities.
Collectively, insurers release a huge amount of
educational literature in the form of newsletters, white papers, email
updates, blogs, and so on.192 A recent newsletter by a major reinsurer,
for example, addresses the use of excessive force.193 The newsletter
reviews recent Department of Justice investigations and public survey
data documenting widespread concerns; quickly summarizes the
relevant constitutional cases; walks through some of the “contributing
factors that may influence an officer’s decision to use excessive force,”
including inadequate training and a lack of accountability; and surveys
potential reforms, such as body-worn cameras, involvement of outside
personnel in training and investigating use-of-force complaints, and
training and deployments standards for the use of military
equipment.194
Insurers reinforce these written materials with live and multimedia
instruction. Personnel from one pool, for example, take a nine-city road
trip each spring, conducting classroom workshops with names like

See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 210-11; Peter Siegelman,
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J.
1223, 1241-42 (2004).
191 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer E, supra note 92
(focuses on raising municipal awareness of hot topics in policing).
192 See, e.g., Willis HRH Pooling Practice, Changing Rules on Vehicular
Searches, POOLING RISK CONTROL BULLETIN (May 2009), http://www.willis.com/
Documents/Publications/Services/Pooling/Pooling_Bulletin_Law_Enforcement.pdf;
Willis Pooling Practice, The Use of Pepper Spray in Schools, POOLING RISK
CONTROL BULLETIN (Feb. 2008), http://www.willis.com/Documents/Publications/
Services/Pooling/Pooling_Bulletin_Pepper_Spray.pdf; Focus On: Police Volunteers,
Munich
Re
(May
2012),
http://www.munichre.com/site/mram-mobile/get/
documents_E574031337/mram/assetpool.mr_america/PDFs/3_Publications/
Research_Spotlight/focuson_police_volunteers.pdf; Travelers Ins., supra note 31.
193 See, e.g., Focus On: Police—Excessive Use of Force, Munich Re (May 2015),
https://www.munichre.com/site/mram-mobile/get/documents_E876514504/mram/
assetpool.mr_america/PDFs/3_Publications/Research_Spotlight/
FOCUS%20ON_Excess-Force.pdf.
194 Id. There are countless other examples. To give just one more, Travelers
Insurance put out a strip search newsletter in 2010—“The Search for the Best
Strip Search Policy”—that self-consciously told its insurance agents that, “[w]hile it
is important for [them] to be sensitive to the operational challenges jails face, they
can play an important role in helping their clients understand the potential for
liability, as well as identify alternatives for these clients that may bolster
defensible strip search policies.” Travelers Ins., supra note 31.
190
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“legal survival skills for police” or “case law boot camp.”195 Insurers also
facilitate access to online video lessons and other multimedia training
resources delivered through RSS (Real Simple Syndication) feeds or
social media. 196 Some insurers even produce their own training
modules; one pool, for example, works with outside consultants to
produce a one-hour online training program each month on topics such
as Miranda and Fourth Amendment doctrine.197
Insurers also work with agencies to nurture in officers the skills,
characteristics, and judgment necessary to do their job responsibly. For
example, insurers encourage or require insured agencies to train (and
re-train) their officers on certain topics at specified intervals, or to
provide “certified” training programs on high-risk tasks like the use of
electronic stun weapons.198 They also furnish grants to agencies to fund
the agencies’ own loss-prevention training initiatives.199 Some of the
training insurers provide, again, addresses topics generally seen to fall
outside law’s purview but nevertheless causally related to misconduct
or other socially undesirable behavior. For example, experts mentioned
training officers in reading body language or reducing implicit racial
bias.200 Handling stress on the job is another topic that came up.201
195 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 85; see also Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85 (two classroom courses); Telephone
Interview with Consultant B, supra note 95 (describing having conducted, on
behalf of insurers, “hands-on” training on use of force, internal affairs, discipline,
transportation of prisoners, and other topics).
196 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105 (online daily
training bulletin); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool E, supra note 111 (online
training platform provided through outside vendor); Telephone Interview with
Consultant A, supra note 86 (online roll call training, which verifies participation);
Law
Enforcement
Training
Videos,
IND.
MUN.
INS.
PROGRAM,
http://www.indianamip.com/law_enforcement.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2015)
(listing dozens of training videos covering topics such as “Straight Baton
Techniques,” “Line Officer Tactical Shotgun,” “Basic and Power Handcuffing
Techniques,” and “The Miranda Rule”); Willis Pooling Practice, Getting To Know
You (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.willis.com/documents/publications/services/pooling/
20141212_Willis_Pooling_Practice_Getting_To_Know_You.pdf (describing RSS
feeds with video and audio clips).
197 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 85.
198 Member Standards, AWC Risk Mgmt. Serv. Agency, Jan. 2013 (on file with
author) (requiring agencies to re-train officers every three years in enumerated
topics and to have each officer undergo certified Taser training before Taser use);
Travelers Ins., supra note 181 (encouraging agencies not to cut training programs
when budget is tight).
199 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool C, supra note 101; Telephone Interview
with Risk Pool E, supra note 111.
200 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 85; Telephone Interview
with Risk Pool C, supra note 101.
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Officers who deal with stress poorly may be more likely to lose control
and misbehave.202
One noteworthy training tool is the use of virtual-reality simulators
designed to develop good judgment and self-control in high-risk
situations involving vehicle pursuits and the use of force.203 Most of the
experts I asked believe these simulators are a valuable training tool.204
Early empirical research backs up this impression, at least as to the use
of force.205 As one expert explained, unlawful police shootings stem
Telephone Interview with Risk Pool C, supra note 101.
See, e.g., DANIEL CRUSE & JESSE RUBIN, DETERMINANTS OF POLICE BEHAVIOR
5 (1973) (reporting, based on field study, that “the amount of stress seems to have
a good deal of effect on the behavior of the officer”); GAIL A. GOOLKASIAN ET AL.,
COPING WITH POLICE STRESS 10 (1986) (reporting findings that stress can
negatively affect work performance, though noting studies’ limitations); Ronald J.
Burke & Aslaug Mikkelsen, Burnout, Job Stress and Attitudes Towards the Use of
Force by Norwegian Police Officers, 28 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES &
MGMT. 269, 269-72 (2005) (summarizing studies finding that chronic work stress
causes burnout, which is positively and significantly related to the use of force);
Nicolien Kop & Martin C. Euwema, Occupational Stress and the Use of Force by
Dutch Police Officers, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 631 (2001) (reaching a similar
finding); Manny Fernandez, Officer Was Under Stress When He Arrived at Texas
Pool Party, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2015, at A15 (describing lawyer’s
assertion that McKinney, Texas police officer who was videotaped tackling a black
teenager in a bikini outside a pool party was under stress after responding to two
earlier calls involving a suicide and attempted suicide); Mark Bond, The Impact of
Stress and Fatigue on Law Enforcement Officers and Steps To Control It,
INPUBLICSAFETY (Feb. 24, 2014), http://inpublicsafety.com/2014/02/the-impactof-stress-and-fatigue-on-law-enforcement-officers-and-steps-to-control-it (asserting
that officer stress can lead to fatigue, which in turn can lead to misconduct and
“inappropriate reactions to a situation”).
203 See, e.g., SKIDCAR SYS., http://www.skidcar.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2015);
Highest
Rated
Driving
Simulator,
FAAC INC.,
http://www.faac.com/
policesimulators.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2015); Law Enforcement Simulator
Systems, DORON PRECISION SYS., INC., http://www.doronprecision.com/police-lawenforcement-driving-simulation-training-systems-driver-simulators.html
(last
visited Aug. 31, 2015); VIRTRA, http://www.virtra.com/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2015);
MILO RANGE, http://www.milorange.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2015); Law
Enforcement
Training
Solutions,
MEGGITT
TRAINING
SYS.,
http://meggitttrainingsystems.com/Law-Enforcement (last visited Aug. 31, 2015).
204 E.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer E, supra note 92;
Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86 (agreeing, though
cautioning that simulators can teach harmful lessons if not operated correctly).
205 See Craig Bennell & Natalie J. Jones, The Effectiveness of Use of Force
Simulation Training: Final Report (Can. Police Research Ctr., Technical Report
TR-01-2005,
2003),
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcs-plcng/
cn000032136920-eng.pdf; see also Evelyn-Rose Saus et al., The Effect of Brief
Situational Awareness Training in a Police Shooting Simulator: An Experimental
Study, 18 MILITARY PSYCH. S3 (2006).
201
202
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from poor judgment, not poor marksmanship.206 Traditional training
methods like shooting practice at a firearms range can develop the
latter skill but, unlike the simulators, not the former. Yet simulators
are expensive, too much for many municipalities to afford. 207
Leveraging economies of scale, insurers facilitate access to simulator
training by purchasing simulators or covering or subsidizing their
use.208
In the process of educating and training police officers, insurers—
deliberately or not—engage in constitutional interpretation. Take the
use of force as an example.
Criminal procedure scholars have
complained that Fourth Amendment “excessive force doctrine is
extraordinarily abstract” and “fails to provide guidance to police

See Telephone Interview with G. Patrick Gallagher, supra note 125.
Although the most stripped-down simulators sell for around $50,000, more
sophisticated systems quickly hit six figures. See, e.g., Chris Green, Rockford
Police Debut $50,000 Use-of-Force Training Simulator, ROCKFORD REG. STAR (Aug.
22, 2012, 9:04 PM), http://www.rrstar.com/article/20120822/NEWS/308229922
($50,000); Holli Deal Saxon, Simulator Brings Realistic Training to Police,
STATESBORO HERALD, http://www.statesboroherald.com/section/1/article/71037/
($78,000); Jeff Adelson, Simulator Brings Realism to Police Training in St.
Tammany Parish, NOLA.COM (Nov. 30, 2009, 10:35 PM), http://www.nola.com/
northshore/index.ssf/2009/07/simulator_brings_realism_to_po.html ($122,000 in
2005); Hayley Ringle, Tempe’s VirTra Systems Offers Realistic Use-of-Force
Training, PHX. BUS. J. (Nov. 4, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/
phoenix/blog/techflash/2014/11/virtra-systems-brings-virtual-reality-to-police.html
(quoting average cost of $200,000); Stephanie Sanchez, AWC Public Safety Institute
Offers High Tech “Use of Force” Simulator, KAWC (Oct. 29, 2015), http://kawc.org/
post/awc-public-safety-institute-offers-high-tech-use-force-simulator
($250,000);
Issie Lapowsky, The Virtual Reality SIM That Helps Teach Cops When To Shoot,
WIRED (Mar. 30, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/virtra/ ($300,000);
Telephone Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85 (estimating price of driving
simulator at $250,000 plus staffing and shooting simulator at $500,000).
208 See Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer E, supra note 92 (some
pools own simulators); Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86
(same); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85 (sends officers to use
driving simulator in state capital and reimbursing fees for training on use-of-force
simulator); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool C, supra note 101 (plans to
purchase driving simulator); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool E, supra note 111
(reimburses fees for use of driving simulator owned by state agency); Loss Control,
ALA. MUN. INS. CORP., http://www.amicentral.org/loss-control (last visited Aug. 31,
2015) (advertising “an advanced, computer-controlled driver training vehicle” on
which training is available “year around [sic] throughout the state at a minimal
cost to our members,” as well as a “digitally interactive firearms training system,
… available statewide through appointment” with a dedicated coordinator).
206
207
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officers.”209 “This uncertainty in legal authority,” the argument goes,
“results in a lack of institutional guidance and leaves police officers to
exercise their own discretion.”210 While I do not quibble with the claim
that Fourth Amendment doctrine is abstract, what the argument
ignores is that various intermediaries—including, importantly,
insurers—step in to give the law fuller content. Insurers strongly
encourage agencies to incorporate into their policies a “use-of-force
continuum” that specifies what degree of force is appropriate in
different scenarios.211 Moreover, they specifically tie this continuum to
constitutional law, advising, for instance, that, “if an officer acts outside
of the applicable policy and/or training in the use of force, … such acts
could be found by a court to be ‘objectively unreasonable’” and thus
unconstitutional.212
A major reinsurer’s newsletter on strip searches also nicely
illustrates the point. The newsletter was penned in the wake of
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,213 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a New Jersey jail’s
policy of strip-searching all detainees who will be admitted to the jail’s
general population, including those arrested on minor offenses. 214
Again, the insurer pins its advice to the Fourth Amendment. “In the
situation where a strip search is justified,” the column instructs, “the
manner in which the search takes place must be reasonable in order to
meet Fourth Amendment standards. Therefore,” it continues, “searches
should be conducted in a professional manner using a searcher of the
same sex, conducted without physical contact under sanitary
conditions, and done with a degree of privacy.” 215 The standards
Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 446 (2012); see also
Rachel Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 1119, 1127,
1143 (2008).
210 Leong, supra note 209, at 447.
211 See, e.g., Focus On: Police—Excessive Use of Force, Munich Re (May 2015),
https://www.munichre.com/site/mram-mobile/get/documents_E876514504/mram/
assetpool.mr_america/PDFs/3_Publications/Research_Spotlight/
FOCUS%20ON_Excess-Force.pdf; Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies &
Procedures: Suggested Controls for Electronic Stun Weapons, Trident Ins. Servs.
(July
2012),
https://www.argolimited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/
dad1345ec51a64376baf01f33f257328aa66bfd5/G5V9I05T5956/Trident-LELElectronic-Stun-Weapon-Policy-2012.pdf.
212 Munich Re, supra note 193 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
213 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
214 See id. at 1518.
215 Focus
On: Strip Searches in Jails, Munich Re (May 2012),
http://www.munichre.com/site/mram-mobile/get/documents_E2059710005/mram/
assetpool.mr_america/PDFs/3_Publications/Research_Spotlight/focuson_ss_jails.pdf
(emphasis added).
209
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proposed seem basically laudatory—and they might be plausible, if
highly cautious, inferences from dicta in Florence—but they certainly
are not compelled by the Court’s opinion. The opinion, for example,
says nothing about using a searcher of the same sex or conducting
searches in clean locations.
The point is not to dispute the fidelity or utility of the newsletter,
but merely to point out that the insurer’s analysis is doing meaningful
interpretive work—it does not merely recite language from court
opinions.216 Judicial decisions on the law of constitutional criminal
procedure do not answer every question police officers confront on the
job. Insurers frequently fill in the gaps, and they pitch their gap-filling
guidance as constitutional law, or at least they frame it in the language
of constitutional law. 217 Forgiving constitutional standards, coupled
with the doctrine of qualified immunity, then ensure that insurers’
interpretations will stick. As long as an insurer’s legal advice is
reasonable, for example—even if it is incorrect, and contravenes what
the courts ultimately determine the law to be—an officer who follows
the advice will not be held liable for harms that result.218
216 To give one last example, another insurer’s materials include a list of “4th
Amendment Concerns” regarding liability for searches, and state that search
warrants “are not required if officers are … [s]earching individuals under their
voluntary, written consent.” Trident Ins. Servs., Law Enforcement Controls for the
Next Decade, https://www.argolimited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/
0dae73e43ca35e0f44d1f482e6601873e742306b/SZ2D35C34I7O/Trident-LELControls-for-the-Next-Decade-Presentation-2012.pdf.
Requiring written (as
opposed to oral) consent may be good loss-prevention policy, but it is not, as the
materials suggest, required by Fourth Amendment doctrine. See Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
217 Cf. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 234 (explaining that “liability
insurers are often the agents that translate … vague legal standards into a set of
concrete, sometimes very specific rules”).
218 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (pinning qualified
immunity to the “objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by
reference to clearly established law”); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986) (“As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.”). Although qualified immunity would not protect a municipality that adopted
an unconstitutional policy or practice, see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622 (1980), many of the Court’s constitutional tests themselves have some sort of
deferential “reasonableness” component. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 388 (1989) (holding that excessive force claims “are properly analyzed under
the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard”).
Indeed, the
resulting body of lawn respecting individual liability, critics have charged,
incorporates a “double standard of reasonableness.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 648 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate
Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81
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In addition to interpreting constitutional rights, insurers also rankorder them, teaching insureds that some rights are, at least for
practical purposes, more important than others. One prominent
consultant developed a list of twelve high-risk critical tasks that give
rise to the lion’s share of police liability.219 Agency policies regarding
these tasks, the consultant told me, are “need to know”; policies
regarding all other tasks—including some that seem normatively
salient, such as interrogation—are “need to consult.”220 Insurers invest
relatively little effort in preventing this latter sort of constitutional
harm.221 Jurists, in contrast, have largely resisted such crass ordinal
comparison of constitutional entitlements.222
3. Audits
A particularly nettlesome challenge for police reformers has been
ensuring continued compliance with agency policies over time. Most
insurers I spoke to audit the agencies they insure to check how well the
agencies are implementing policies and procedures and attending to

IOWA L. REV. 261, 314 (1995) (arguing that, “[i]n constitutional tort cases, the
intersection of qualified immunity and many other types of constitutional
standards … affords a degree of double-counting to the government”).
219 See G. PATRICK GALLAGHER, SUCCESSFUL POLICE RISK MANAGEMENT 52-63
(2014).
220 Telephone Interview with G. Patrick Gallagher, supra note 125. Travelers
Insurance also encourages focus on the “highest risk exposures” including “Use of
Force” and “Search and Seizure.” Travelers Ins., supra note 181.
221 See John Rappaport, An Insurance-Based Typology of Police Misconduct,
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. __ (forthcoming).
222 See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 568-69 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“It is wrong to use some
constitutional provisions as springboards for major social change while treating
others like senile relatives to be cooped up in a nursing home until they quit
annoying us. As guardians of the Constitution, we must be consistent in
interpreting its provisions…. Expanding some [constitutional provisions] to
gargantuan proportions while discarding others like a crumpled gum wrapper is
not faithfully applying the Constitution; it’s using our power as federal judges to
constitutionalize our personal preferences.”); Parks v. “Mr. Ford,” 556 F.2d 132,
154 (3d Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (“I would not adopt the hierarchical
approach to constitutional values … because I know of no principled basis upon
which to say that the national law in one area is less entitled to implementation by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause than the national law in another area.”); Isaacs v.
Bd. of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (“It is
difficult, and perhaps impossible, to arrange federal constitutional rights in an
ascending hierarchy of value.”).
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loss prevention generally.223 Audits take place on both a regular and
as-needed basis. The experts I interviewed reported conducting regular
audits ranging from semi-annual to once every three years.224 Some
insurers use online updates in between audits or encourage self-audits
in addition.225
Insurers send auditors or retained consultants to visit insured
agencies, sometimes for two to three days at a time. 226 Auditors
typically tour the facilities and meet with the chief, sheriff, or other
important agency executives, and sometimes with the city manager as
well.227 Auditors might also review police reports, internal affairs files,
and other liability-related documentation.228 They may go out in the
field with the chief or other officers. 229 One pool even sends pool
personnel to patronize “cop bars,” listen, and observe, being careful to
dispatch new faces each time to maintain cover.230 Auditors evaluate
and in some cases score the audited agencies and discuss with agency
leadership how the agency can better manage risk.231

223 Cf. BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 14, at 272 (observing that, in the face of
liability threats, businesses commonly “submit to inspections by the loss control
representatives dispatched by liability insurance companies”); Ben-Shahar &
Logue, supra note 14, at 236-37 (“Monitoring is often done more effectively by
insurers that develop regulatory practices and technologies that the government
lacks.”). In at least one state, the pool does not audit its member agencies because
the state board of peace officer standards and training (POST) does. See Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 85.
224 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61 (every three
years); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105 (annual); Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool E, supra note 111 (semi-annual).
225 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool E, supra note 111 (requires periodic
online updates); Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies & Procedures:
Monitoring Compliance with Law Enforcement Manual, Trident Ins. Servs. (July
2012),
https://www.argolimited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/
1ff185e22af3a5c38781aa76ee68fcccad4ee5e6/IQJ40V3Z1A83/Trident-LELCompliance_with-Manual-2012.pdf (providing guidelines for self-audits).
226 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105; Telephone Interview
with Consultant A, supra note 86.
227 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61; Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85; Telephone Interview with Risk Pool C,
supra note 101.
228 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105; Telephone Interview
with Consultant A, supra note 86.
229 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85; Telephone Interview
with Risk Pool D, supra note 105.
230 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105.
231 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61; Telephone
Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86.
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Many insurers keep a separate “watch list” for municipalities
experiencing problematic loss runs. These municipalities are audited
more frequently and sometimes more intensely. Meetings might
include members of the board of the pool, for example, and top city
officials.232 One consultant told me that, when called in for this type of
audit, he typically spends two to five days at the agency with a team of
up to four people.233 Continued coverage might then be predicated on
cooperation with insurer-recommended initiatives or the guidance of
chosen consultants.234
4. Accreditation
Many insurers encourage police agencies to obtain accreditation
from a recognized accreditation agency like CALEA. 235 To become
accredited, a police department must adopt and demonstrate
compliance with an extensive set of standards that incorporates
industry best practices. It must also pass an on-site review by a team of
CALEA-trained assessors. Reaccreditation occurs every three years.236
232 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61; Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool C, supra note 101.
233 Telephone Interview with Consultant B, supra note 95.
234 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 88.
235 Accreditation can increase the odds that an insurer will offer coverage. See
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101. It can lower
rates as well. See Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61;
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101; see also Risk
Management, Liability Insurance, and CALEA Accreditation, CALEA,
http://www.calea.org/content/risk-management-liability-insurance-and-caleaaccreditation (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (maintaining list of “liability insurance
providers known to CALEA to offer some type of financial incentive to CALEA
accredited agencies”); Ileana Garcia, Slidell Police Accreditation Keeps the
Department’s Insurance Rate Low, SLIDELL SENTRY-NEWS, reprinted in CALEA
UPDATE MAG., Feb. 2001, http://www.calea.org/calea-update-magazine/issue-75/
accreditation-works/slidell-police-accreditation-keeps-departments-in;
McCoy,
supra note 174, at 145 (quoting police executive who reported 16.7% discount for
accreditation). Some insurers also reimburse their insureds for the fees associated
with obtaining accreditation. Telephone Interview with Risk Pool C, supra note
101.
236 See Garcia, supra note 235, at __ (discussing accreditation process and
upkeep); see also Standards Titles, CALEA, http://www.calea.org/content/
standards-titles (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (listing standards); Law Enforcement
Program: The Standards, CALEA, http://www.calea.org/content/law-enforcementprogram-standards (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) (stating requirement of compliance
with
standards);
Law
Enforcement
Program:
Process,
CALEA,
http://www.calea.org/content/law-enforcement-program-process (last visited Nov.
22, 2015) (describing on-site assessment and reaccreditation process).
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Crediting accreditation is naturally understood as a way of outsourcing
policy review and auditing functions to the accreditation agencies.237
There is some evidence suggesting that CALEA-accredited agencies
exhibit reduced liability risk,238 but there is also evidence going the
other way.239 None of the studies in either direction is rigorous or peerreviewed. And even if a relationship between accreditation and
aggregate loss does exist, it is not necessarily causal. One expert I
interviewed observed that, in his experience, the police executives who
undertake accreditation are the same ones already concerned about
police professionalism.240
5. Personnel
It has become conventional wisdom that a relatively small number
of “bad apple” police officers commit a disproportionate amount of
misconduct and receive a likewise disproportionate number of citizen
complaints.241 Based on this finding, police scholars have touted the
outsized benefits of “early warning systems” designed to identify these
bad apples before they rot.242 Without necessarily employing the same
terminology, insurers, too, analyze agency data to determine whether
certain officers are contributing excessively to the agency’s aggregate
On the potential advantages of outsourcing arrangements, see HEIMER,
supra note 93, at 206-09.
238 CALEA, supra note 235 (linking to studies by pools finding “positive
correlation between accreditation and loss reduction”).
239 See David Packman, Can Accreditation Affect Police Misconduct Rates?,
CATO INST.: NAT’L POLICE MISCONDUCT REPORTING PROJECT (Nov. 29, 2009, 3:45
AM), http://www.policemisconduct.net/can-accreditation-affect-police-misconductrates/ (finding that CALEA-accredited agencies report more misconduct than the
average similarly sized agency); see also ROBERT J. GIROD, POLICE LIABILITY AND
RISK MANAGEMENT 8 (2014) (reporting tensions in the evidence regarding the
effects of accreditation). The uncertain effects of accreditation have made some
insurers skeptical that pursuing accreditation is cost-justified. See, e.g., Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105.
240 Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86.
241 See, e.g., HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 171 (1977); Kenneth
Adams, What We Know About Police Use of Force, in NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USE OF FORCE BY POLICE 1, 8-9 (1999); Barbara Armacost,
Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 459-60
(2004); Christopher J. Harris, The Residual Career Patterns of Police Misconduct,
40 J. CRIM. JUST. 323, 324 (2012); Samuel Walker et al., Responding to the Problem
Officer: A National Study of Early Warning Systems 2.4-2.6 (2000),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/184510.pdf.
242 See, e.g., WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 7, at 137-77; Armacost, supra
note 241, at 527; Walker et al., supra note 241.
237
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risk.
Some insurers pressure agencies to “correct,” or even to
terminate, these problem officers, sometimes at pains of cancelling
coverage.243 We know that the insurers succeed at least some of the
time.244 Even police chiefs can be vulnerable when insurers pressure
municipal leadership to make a change. 245
One consultant I
interviewed was unabashed about his power to effect changes at the
top, recalling more than one occasion on which police chiefs had been
dismissed after a city manager retained him for a management study.246
Reading between the lines a bit, I got the sense that he brandishes his
track record to secure cooperation from chiefs who initially resist
implementing his loss-prevention advice.
B. Underwriting
Lurking behind everything I have said about loss prevention is a
crucial question: Why do police agencies cooperate with insurers’ lossprevention initiatives? Why, at the urging of insurers, do they change
their policies, train their officers differently, open their doors to
invasive audits, and even fire police professionals? The answer, at
which I have already hinted, is underwriting—the process by which
insurers evaluate a risk to decide what coverage, if any, to offer or
renew, and for what price. Control over the availability and pricing of
coverage gives the insurers the leverage to effect change within police
agencies. Underwriting decisions also serve to educate agencies about
the likelihood of suit.
As part of the underwriting process, insurers amass information
from extensive applications they require municipalities to submit, along
with site visits in some cases. The policy applications reveal the sorts of
See Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105. Other insurers,
in contrast, expressed reluctance to be seen as meddling in personnel matters for
fear of liability exposure under employment-related laws. See, e.g., Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool C, supra note 101.
244 See, e.g., Alex Green, Niota Officials Tied to Beating Fired; They Say
Insurance Company Forced the Action, TIMES FREE PRESS (Chattanooga), Aug. 24,
2013 (quoting mayor’s report that city’s coverage would have been dropped if two
officers involved in misconduct had been allowed back on duty).
245 Rob Karwath, Calumet City Will Lose Police Liability Insurance, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Mar. 29, 1988 (reporting council member’s comment that city’s insurance
cancellation was “the final argument for the mayor to pick a new police chief from
outside the department” when the interim chief retired); Rutledge Mayor “Had No
Choice” in Firing: Police Chief Refused To Resign; City at Risk of Losing Insurance,
KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Mar. 23, 2010 (reporting mayor’s assertion he “had no
choice” but to fire police chief accused of misconduct because “the city was at risk of
losing its liability insurance” if chief remained (internal quotation marks omitted)).
246 Telephone Interview with G. Patrick Gallagher, supra note 125.
243
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information insurers find relevant to their underwriting decisions.247
Unsurprisingly, it largely overlaps with the information insurers
impart to their insureds through loss-prevention programs. That is, the
more a municipality is doing to attend to loss prevention by adopting
and maintaining compliance with adequate policies, training officers
responsibly, controlling or cutting ties with problem officers, and so on,
the more favorably an insurer will regard the municipality during
underwriting.
Specifically, insurers gather data in eight categories:248 (1) general
information, such as the municipality’s population and any significant
operations within the jurisdiction, like a college or amusement park;249
(2) policies and procedures on high-risk issues like the use of force,
copies of which municipalities must attach;250 (3) education and training
requirements, as well as accreditation;251 (4) 911 dispatching protocols;
(5) jail operations, where applicable;252 (6) personnel, including whether
the department employs part-time auxiliary officers or police dogs;253 (7)
247 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61
(describing application and renewal process and explaining that application
questions drive underwriting).
248 See, e.g., Police Professional Liability Insurance Application, Prof’l Gov’tal
Underwriters,
Inc.
(May
1999),
https://www.scui.com/jackson/pdfs/
broke_pub_entity_apps/PGUI-Police_Prof_App-Darwin.pdf;
Law
Enforcement
Liability Application, CNA, https://www.oldnationalins.com/pdfs/Insurance/JWFApplications/Law-Enforcement-Liability-Application.pdf.
249 Other general information includes moonlighting policies and contractual
arrangements with other entities for policing services.
250 See Harry F. Brooks, Public Entity Risk Management—Part II, AM. AGENT &
BROKER, Oct. 1993, at 12, 14; Child, supra note 161, at 32-33. More specific
prompts ask whether a policies-and-procedures manual exists, how often it is
revised and by whom, how it is distributed and taught, whether the agency
conducts procedures-compliance monitoring, and whether it requires and follows
up on use-of-force reports.
251 See Brooks, supra note 250, at 14; Harry F. Brooks, Loss-Control Techniques
for Public Entities, AM. AGENT & BROKER, Apr. 1997, at 15 (“Perhaps the major
underwriting consideration in police professional liability insurance is the training
of police officers.”). Applications ask about the minimum education requirements
for officers; background investigation and psychological testing of job applicants;
training on the use of batons, mace, control holds, stun guns, and canines; and inservice training updates.
252 Typical questions ask about jail operations manuals, capacity constraints,
inspections, and audio and video recordings.
253 “Risk exposure for public law enforcement entities has changed, thereby
requiring that broader underwriting factors be taken into consideration, such as
size of the police force, size of the city, prior department claims’ experience,
reoccurring altercations and, often, racial and/or ethnic diversity of the police
force.” Susan Kostro, Police Excessive Force Raises Liability Risk Scrutiny,
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prior insurance information; and (8) claims history, typically extending
back five years.
In addition to generating useful information for the insurers, the
applications communicate to the municipalities the factors that will
likely affect the insurers’ underwriting decisions.254 This creates an
incentive for municipalities to ensure that they are able, insofar as
practicable, to provide answers that will result in favorable
underwriting responses. When they cannot, insurers respond in several
ways.
1. Coverage Denial
Neither commercial carriers nor pools are required to write coverage
for any particular municipality. Many experts I interviewed attested to
using the denial or nonrenewal of coverage as a tool to encourage
desirable behavior.255 Withholding coverage puts a municipality in a
tough position, often forcing a choice between self-insurance and
commercial coverage from the pricey “surplus market.” 256 In the
extreme, as I mentioned earlier, coverage denial can even lead a
municipality to shutter its police force.257
An insurer, for example, might review a municipality’s police
policies and procedures and refuse to write if they are inconsistent with
TRENDING “@” IRONSHORE (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.ironshore.com/blog/policeexcessive-force-raises-liability-risk-scrutiny.
254 Cf. Schlanger, supra note 29, at 18 (discussing how reporting requirements
foster consideration by the reporters of otherwise overlooked issues).
255 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer E, supra note 92;
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34; Telephone
Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101; Telephone Interview with
Risk Pool B, supra note 85.
256 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101.
257 See, e.g., Church, supra note 71, at 17, 18 (reporting that police patrols were
suspended in two towns and five counties closed their jails due to a lack of
coverage); Tyler Jett, City of Niota, Tenn., Shutting Down. Again., TIMES FREE
PRESS (Chattanooga), June 19, 2013 (reporting that city’s “police department is
closed” after pool pulled coverage); Liability Insurance in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
4, 1986, at A26 (reporting that “police in West Orange, N.J., had to stop patrolling
in cars they could no longer insure”); Schwartz, How Governments Pay, supra note
10, at 28-29 & nn.133-39 (collecting four examples of police departments that
closed due to premium increases or termination of coverage); cf. Ed Leefeldt, FarReaching Implications Confront Insurers in the Trayvon Martin Case, FINE PRINT
(Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.insure.com/blog/far-reaching-implications-confrontinsurers-in-the-trayvon-martin-case.html
(“Absent
strict
rules,
insurance
companies are likely to shut down Neighborhood Watch programs, particularly
those sponsored by police, because the liability for the municipality is huge.”).
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industry best practices.258 Or it might insert a contingency—called a
“subjectivity” in insurance parlance—into its quote, making the offer of
coverage contingent on the agency’s revision of its procedures.259 And a
municipality with a significant history of police abuse claims, one
broker explained, would have considerable trouble getting coverage at
all.260 Similarly, an insurer might drop coverage from a municipality
that ignores the insurer’s loss-prevention advice or fails to follow
through on a promise made to the insurer.261 This might include, for
instance, a promise to fire a particular officer.262
2. Differentiated Premiums
On their face, the data collected in insurance applications suggest
that insurers engage in both feature-rating and experience-rating—that
is, both the police agency’s characteristics and policies and its past loss
history influence the premium price.
My interviews generally
confirmed this to be the case, 263 although a few insurers seemed to
suggest that premiums were predominantly, if not exclusively,
experience-rated with little to no consideration of a municipality’s riskmanagement efforts. 264 Insurers that do use feature-rating talked
about adjusting premiums based on the existence and quality of agency
policies and compliance with training and other loss-prevention
initiatives. 265 With similar effect, some insurers give discounts to
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101.
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer E, supra note 92.
260 Telephone Interview with Commercial Broker B, supra note 36.
261 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85 (kicked out a member,
which was later readmitted); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105
(expelled two members that were not cooperating with loss control); Telephone
Interview with G. Patrick Gallagher, supra note 125 (retained by pools to conduct
risk assessments of troubled municipalities, with negative findings resulting in
expulsion from the pool).
262 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101.
263 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Broker B, supra note 36;
Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 85; see also ICMA Report, supra
note 83, at 25 (finding that “premiums for local governments with a history of
claims are higher than those paid by local governments with no claims’ [sic]
history”).
264 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34; Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 105; Telephone Interview with Risk Pool E,
supra note 111.
265 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer E, supra note 92 (inquires
about how policies are promulgated and reviewed and how training works);
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101 (considers
existence and quality of policies); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note
258
259
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agencies accredited by CALEA or a similar body.266 Many pools also
refund excess contributions to their members annually. That is, if the
collected contributions exceed the pool’s total losses in a given year, the
pool will distribute the excess to its members as cash refunds or credits
against future contributions.267 This creates an incentive for members
to reduce aggregate losses.
In an extreme case, differentiated
premiums can become functionally equivalent to a coverage denial, as
in the case when a pool “prices a member out” to the “standard
market.”268
3. Deductibles and Self-Insured Retentions
A number of experts I interviewed stressed the importance of
deductibles and self-insured retentions in managing moral hazard.
Many informed me that they require all municipalities to retain some
risk through one of these mechanisms.269 Raising the deductible or selfinsured retention is also one of the first ways an insurer might attempt
to coax good behavior from a recalcitrant agency.270 Municipalities need
to have “skin in the game,” one expert advised;271 the more risk they
retain, said another, “the more religion they get.” 272 One insurer
relayed that, in his experience, pools that do not require members to
assume a deductible—those that write first-dollar coverage—tend to
have problems controlling risk.273 The loss-prevention coordinator for a
pool of small and mid-sized cities, however, told me that his pool does

85 (raises contributions by 20% for failure to comply with recommended best
practices); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool C, supra note 101 (notifies
underwriting about obstinate agencies, which are warned of a possible contribution
increase); Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86 (premiums
adjusted based on adherence to policy and training); Telephone Interview with
Consultant B, supra note 95 (some insurers give discounts to agencies that adopt
insurer-approved model policies).
266 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101
(20-25% discount for CALEA).
267 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85.
268 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34.
269 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61;
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 88.
270 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 88; Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85.
271 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34.
272 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101.
273 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61.
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write first-dollar policies and that occurrences among his members are
fairly rare.274
4. Limits
Underwriters can also manage risk by imposing limits on the
amount of liability they’re willing to insure. All police liability policies
have some ceiling, but insurers sometimes impose a cap on a particular
insured that differs from the default limit in the insurer’s standard
policy forms. In addition, insurers can use line limits to encourage
improvements in very particular areas. For example, if a department
has an inadequate policy governing high-speed car chases, its insurer
might impose a line limit on claims stemming from such pursuits.275
C. The Regulatory Role of Reinsurers
Reinsurers, though one step removed from the police agencies
themselves, are also active regulators. Just as primary insurers do, by
assuming the risk of police liability, reinsurers develop the incentive to
invest in cost-effective mechanisms to reduce police misconduct. As a
rule of thumb, the sooner the reinsurer’s liability kicks in—the lower
the “attachment point”—the stronger this incentive will be, and so the
more assertively the reinsurer will pursue loss prevention. A reinsurer
that backs a pool with a $100,000 self-insured retention, that is, will be
more proactive about preventing loss than if the retention were $1
million.276
Many of the loss-prevention measures reinsurers take mirror, at one
step removed, the primary insurers’ techniques. So, where primary
insurers review police agencies’ policies and procedures for
incorporation of industry best practices, reinsurers review primary
insurers’ coverage documents for incorporation of loss-prevention

Telephone Interview with Risk Pool E, supra note 111 (offers a deductible
option that few cities select); see also Public Entity Solutions, supra note 9
(advertising “first dollar or SIR on all lines or risks”); Mississippi Municipal
Liability Plan, MISS. MUN. SERV. CO., http://msmsc.com/about/liability-plan (last
visited Aug. 31, 2015) (“[T]he Liability Plan has been able to provide first dollar
coverage for municipal exposures including, but not limited to, … law enforcement
liability.”). See generally ICMA Report, supra note 83, at 19 (reporting deductibles
on municipal police liability policies in 1991).
275 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 88.
276 See Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 88;
Telephone Interview with Commercial Broker A, supra note 87; Mendoza, supra
note 77, at 76.
274
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incentives. 277 Where primary insurers encourage agencies to seek
accreditation from CALEA, reinsurers encourage pools to seek
“recognition” from the Association of Governmental Risk Pools.278 And
where primary insurers pressure police agencies to cut ties with
problem officers, reinsurers urge pools to disassociate from problem
municipalities.279
Reinsurers commonly view their role as supporting the primary
insurers’ loss-prevention initiatives.
This often entails funding
insurers’ loss-prevention programs.280 A reinsurer, for example, might
subsidize a pool’s purchase of a use-of-force simulator or pay for the
online training program it provides to its members.281 It might give
grants to pools to audit their member agencies or bring in speakers to
provide live training. 282 And reinsurers may fund pools’ own lossprevention grant programs; that is, when a police agency receives a
loss-prevention grant from its insurer, the funds may actually come
from the reinsurer behind the insurer.283
More generally, in everything they do, insurers operate against the
backdrop of reinsurance underwriting. As one pool official put it: “The
impact upon the pricing and availability of reinsurance … is on my
mind, influencing each and every decision that I make.” 284 When
setting reinsurance rates, reinsurers examine how well insurers
manage risk among their insureds.
How is the insurer’s riskmanagement department staffed? Does it provide sample policies and
procedures? If so, how are they communicated to the insureds? Is their
adoption required? How does the insurer handle problematic agencies?
How often does the insurer audit its insureds? How does information
from risk management and claims management flow back to and inform
the insurer’s underwriting? The answers to these questions, along with
the insurer’s loss history and the results of any audit, help a reinsurer
decide whether to write a policy and what rates to set. This gives
insurers an incentive to improve their underwriting and loss-prevention

See Mendoza, supra note 77, at 78, 83-84.
See id. at 85.
279 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34.
280 See, e.g., id.
281 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool C, supra note 101; Telephone Interview
with Risk Pool E, supra note 111.
282 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer C, supra note 114; Telephone
Interview with Commercial Insurer G, supra note 101.
283 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool E, supra note 111.
284 Mendoza, supra note 77, at 74 (quoting senior official from the Missouri
Housing Authorities Property and Casualty, Inc.) (alteration in original).
277
278
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programs.285 This may partly explain why some pools obtain ratings
from credit agencies. As part of the credit-rating process, ratings
agencies review pools’ liability management; a positive rating implies
good risk management, which in turn should lower reinsurance rates.286
D. A Note on Making Governments Pay
A rich and evolving literature debates whether and how the threat
of civil liability deters wrongdoing by government actors.287 Without
taking a firm position on these questions, I detour briefly here to add
my qualitative findings to the mix. At the end of the day, insurers can
essentially threaten only to hike rates or increase a municipality’s
financial exposure by capping coverage, raising the deductible or selfinsured retention, or, in a serious case, terminating coverage. That is,
insurers can threaten only pecuniary harm. For the most part, insurers
report success at getting police officials to respond to these incentives.
The interesting theoretical question is why, given that public dollars,
not personal ones, will be used to satisfy any financial obligation.
I asked this question—why police officials mind if premiums go up—
in every interview. The responses varied, but three themes emerged.
First, police agencies care about “professionalism”—about being seen as
doing things “the right way.” 288 Professionalism is reputational
285 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer C, supra note 114; Telephone
Interview with Commercial Insurer E, supra note 92; Mendoza, supra note 77, at
74-102 (describing, based on survey of pools, how reinsurers influence pools’
underwriting, claims management, and financial planning); see also Telephone
Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85 (describing how pool’s representatives
traveled to London to meet with Lloyd’s of London, which resulted in a rate
decrease, and how its reinsurers come on-site to review the pool’s performance);
Abramovsky, supra note 142, at 375-405 (describing how reinsurance functions like
private regulation).
286 See Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61
(agreeing that this pricing effect seems likely, though disclaiming personal
knowledge).
287 See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The
Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001); Daryl J.
Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). Joanna Schwartz reviews the
relevant work in a recent working paper. See Schwartz, How Governments Pay,
supra note 10, at 5-8.
288 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86; David Alan
Sklansky, The Persistent Pull of Police Professionalism, in NEW PERSPECTIVES IN
POLICING (Mar. 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/232676.pdf; Christopher
Stone & Jeremy Travis, Toward a New Professionalism in Policing, 2013 J. INST.
JUST. INT’L STUD. 11 (2014).
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currency. Insurers understand this, and they hire experienced former
officers to help them bridge the cultural gap and repackage loss
prevention as “professionalism enhancement.”289 On this view, rising
insurance premiums signal an increasing likelihood of a reputationthreatening liability event.290
Second, insurers are adept at translating financial incentives into
political ones. Unlike a court, which can only issue an order and let the
chips fall where they may, an insurer can pick up the phone and call
the city manager or the mayor to generate political pressure on police
leadership. One expert, for example, told me that, if his pool is getting
resistance from a poorly performing municipality, he will alert the city
manager that the city’s costs are rising because of the police, and
furnish charts comparing the city’s costs to those of comparable
members.291 Some experts, however, were more pessimistic, reporting
that politicians often fail to demand necessary changes even when
coaxed by their insurers.292
Third, the financial consequences themselves are sometimes
sufficient to motivate change. One veteran consultant explained that
most police officers do not understand the extent to which they’re
insured against liability for misconduct and, moreover, they’re told that
liability saps the pool of money available for raises and equipment.293
The latter tale may not always be true, but sometimes it is. In a recent
empirical study, Joanna Schwartz found that some police agencies do
feel, in a budgetary sense, the impact of financial payouts. It is not the
289 See EPP, supra note 10, at 20-24, 97-98, 108-09 (asserting that “what agency
officials fear most about liability is the threat of public embarrassment and
reputational damage” and discussing the connection between avoiding liability and
maintaining professional standards); GALLAGHER, supra note 219, at 10 (“If risk
management concepts drive police performance there will be two solid effects:
liability will be decreased and organizational professionalism will be enhanced.”).
290 See Baker & Swedloff, supra note 54, at 1419 (“Insurance prices are highly
credible loss prevention signals ….”); see also Susan K. Laury & Melayne Morgan
McInnes, The Impact of Insurance Prices on Decision Making Biases: An
Experimental Analysis, 70 J. RISK & INS. 219 (2003) (finding that actuarially fair
insurance premiums can debias individual consumers’ risk decisions).
291 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool B, supra note 85.
292 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool E, supra note 111; Telephone Interview
with G. Patrick Gallagher, supra note 125; see also Telephone Interview with Risk
Pool B, supra note 85 (reporting that sheriffs tend to be more resistant because
they are elected rather than appointed).
293 Telephone Interview with Consultant A, supra note 86; see also GEOFFREY P.
ALPERT ET AL., POLICE PURSUITS 151 (2000) (“Perhaps the best justification for
effective law enforcement risk management measures is the funding that can be
reallocated, from law enforcement liability … premiums, to critical law
enforcement needs such as increased personnel, new equipment or training.”).
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case, as many have believed,294 that the money for insurance premiums,
judgments, and settlements always comes out of general treasury
funds.295 Schwartz’s qualitative findings are also consistent with my
own—police officials in these paying jurisdictions, she finds, report that
lawsuits impact their daily operations.296
III. QUESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The realization that a vast private industry stands between our
legal institutions and the police, and changes the way the police behave,
raises numerous normative questions. Perhaps the most pressing of
these is whether insurers raise or lower the level of police misconduct. I
take up this question in Section A. I consider the potential problem of
overregulation by insurers in Section B. In Section C, I consider
whether police liability insurance makes the police less democratically
accountable. In Section D, I ask how the presence of insurers in the
system may affect the content of criminal procedure law. And in
Section E, I explore how we might use the law to regulate insurers to
increase social welfare.
A. Does Police Insurance Reduce Police Misconduct?
At this point a cautionary note is due. I have focused on describing
the ways in which liability insurers can influence police agencies in an
effort to reduce misconduct. I have not, however, proven that liability
insurance today actually does reduce police misconduct. This is a
difficult empirical question. The theory, and the shreds of evidence I
have gathered, point in each direction. The empirical study that comes
closest to examining this question, which I discuss below, looks bad, but
there are good reasons to think it is not the final word.
Let me begin with my greatest reason for optimism. Although there
are no rigorous studies attempting to measure the effect of insurance on
the rate of police misconduct, there are studies that test the effect of
some of the tools that insurers use in their loss-prevention programs.
For example, insurers typically require police agencies to promulgate
294 See Schwartz, How Governments Pay, supra note 10, at 7 n.26 (collecting
sources).
295 Id. at 30.
296 See id. at 32-33; see also Joseph L. Colletti, Risk Management: How Do You
Know They Know?, 31 J. CAL. L. ENFORCEMENT, 1997, at 16, 18 (“[L]ower pay out
for claims results in more funds for department programs and the purchase of
needed equipment.”); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555,
1676 (2003).
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and maintain adequate policies on vehicle pursuits, the use of force, and
other high-risk conduct. Studies suggest that these policies do, on
balance, reduce the covered harms.297 Other research has found that
body-worn cameras and training on use-of-force simulators, which
insurers also encourage, reduce the inappropriate use of force.298 The
basic point is that, to the extent researchers have identified successful
strategies for reducing police misconduct, insurers seem to be doing a
pretty good job of coaxing police agencies into using them.299 They also
encourage additional reforms like community outreach and stress
management that, while not rigorously proven to help, many believe to
be promising as well. To put the point slightly differently, if all of the
insurers’ efforts fail, it is not clear what will work.
This is not to say that self-insured municipalities make no use of
these loss-prevention strategies. But market insurers are more likely to
locate control over loss prevention outside the municipality, which can
make it more effective. “It is usually the case,” Carol Heimer explains,
“that the [insured] will have mixed reactions to loss prevention, being
interested in loss-prevention activity only as long as it does not divert
too much time and energy from other, more rewarding activities.”300
“By encouraging the relocation of loss-prevention activities to
organizations that do not benefit from neglecting them,” Heimer
continues, “insurers increase the likelihood that these activities will
actually be carried out.” 301
In addition, the development and
implementation of loss-prevention technology is in many cases a public
good, making it difficult, at least in theory, to motivate investment by
individual municipalities, which will not capture all of the benefits.
See, e.g., ALPERT ET AL., supra note 293, at 15 (high-speed pursuits); Stephen
A. Bishopp et al., An Examination of the Effect of a Policy Change on Police Use of
TASERs, 26 CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 727 (2015) (electronic stun weapons); James J.
Fyfe, Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform, 5 JUST. Q. 165 (1988)
(firearms).
298 On body-worn cameras, see Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police BodyWorn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A
Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 509 (2015); Cole Zercoe,
Body Camera Study: Denver Police See Drop in Arrests, UOF Complaints (Sept. 4,
2015), POLICEONE, http://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/
9485301-Body-camera-study-Denver-police-see-drop-in-arrests-UOF-complaints/.
On simulators, see sources cited supra notes 203-208. As noted earlier, there is
mixed evidence on whether accreditation, which many insurers promote, tends to
reduce loss. See supra notes 238-240 and accompanying text.
299 But see Rappaport, supra note 221, at __ (arguing that insurers promote
loss-prevention technologies much more aggressively in some policing contexts
than others).
300 HEIMER, supra note 93, at 14.
301 Id.
297
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Insurers and outside organizations like accreditors can help overcome
these collective action problems.302
There is some evidence that bears out this theory in the policing
context. Carol Archbold surveyed the 354 largest municipal law
enforcement agencies—a good share of which, presumably, are selfinsured—about their risk-management programs. Only 14 of the 354—
a little under 4%—reported having any risk-management initiatives.303
Based on these data, Archbold concluded that “risk management
programs are still in the infancy stage of being embraced by police
agencies.” 304 Likewise, one reinsurer I interviewed speculated that
many large, self-insured municipalities would be better off with
primary coverage from the market.
Absent some external
accountability mechanism, municipalities can become “insular”;
according to this expert, self-insured municipalities do not, for example,
tend to participate in risk-management conferences, and thus
potentially miss out on valuable information sharing.305
There are several reasons to be cautious, however. First, as I noted
at the outset, I make no claim that the sample of insurers I interviewed
is representative. I cannot rule out the possibility that a substantial
share of insurers are insufficiently attentive to loss prevention, and
thus may increase (through moral hazard), rather than decrease, the
amount of covered misconduct. Some of the experts I spoke to raised
this possibility. One reinsurer, for example, said that, while many pools
are serious about managing members’ risk, others are “country club
pools” more concerned with maintaining friendly relationships. And the
loss-prevention programs at many pools, he added, had become
See id. at 14-15 & n.9.
See ARCHBOLD, supra note 112, at 62, 77-79. The other agencies relied on
police legal advisors, city or county attorneys, or private contract attorneys to
handle liability issues. See id. at 77-79.
304 Id. at 25; see also GALLAGHER, supra note 219, at 10-15 (calling the “absence
of emphasis on risk management” a “glaring deficiency” in policing); WALKER &
ARCHBOLD, supra note 7, at 230 (asserting that “very few police agencies use risk
management”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1055, 1095-1101 (2015) (reviewing evidence that few police
departments have risk managers); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of
Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1023 (2010) (finding that the largest police agencies only rarely learn from
lawsuits filed against them or their officers); Telephone Interview with Commercial
Insurer A, supra note 61 (opining that most small municipalities have no in-house
risk-management program).
But see Telephone Interview with Commercial
Insurer E, supra note 92 (asserting, based on professional experience, that
municipalities with large self-insured retentions usually have risk management
programs in place).
305 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 88.
302
303
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“routine.” 306 Another expert described the pools as not especially
sophisticated.307
Still, these same two experts also said that pools, on the whole, are
getting better rather than worse.308 And the snapshot I’ve taken in this
Article, it bears note, captures a soft insurance market.309 In a soft
market, insurers tend to be more lax about underwriting, and less
forceful about loss prevention, as they compete for premium dollars and
market share.
Harder markets typically entail more exacting
standards for municipalities striving to maintain coverage and keep
rates down.310
Second, “not all ‘loss prevention’ to the insurance company results in
loss prevention to society.”311 If an insurer refuses to cover or renew a
municipality because its police agency is a “bad risk,” the municipality
then goes bare, and the agency’s officers continue to commit
misconduct, the insurance company has decreased its own liability but
has not reduced social loss.312 Or, as the point is sometimes put, there
can be a difference between “liability prevention” (what the insurer
wants) and “loss prevention” (what society wants).313 It is possible, in
particular, that the “blue wall of silence”—the refusal of many police to
report on another officer’s wrongdoings—increases social loss (by
reducing the expected sanction for misconduct, and thus weakening
deterrence) yet decreases liability (by depriving complainants of
evidence necessary to mount a case). One worries that insurers’
incentives may point in the wrong direction here.
This is a real concern, although it may not be as grave as it first
appears. As an initial matter, it is far from clear that insurers’ stance
on the “blue wall of silence,” when compared to deep-set cultural and
institutional forces, meaningfully affects whether a closed-lipped police
culture predominates. But more important, precisely because the “blue
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34.
Telephone Interview with G. Patrick Gallagher, supra note 125.
308 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34; Telephone
Interview with G. Patrick Gallagher, supra note 125; accord Mendoza, supra note
77, at 125 (“Pooling as a whole is finally beginning to ideologically move from the
mindset of a ‘country-club’ attitude to a small mutual insurance enterprise.”
(quoting pool official) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
309 E.g., Telephone Interview No. 2 with Commercial Insurer C (Sept. 29, 2015);
Telephone Interview No. 2 with Commercial Insurer D (Oct. 13, 2015).
310 See BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 15, at 55-56 (“[N]o snapshot of the
underwriting process can present an adequate basis for understanding insurance
underwriting over time.”).
311 Cohen, supra note 17, at 327.
312 See id.
313 Baker & Siegelman, supra note 11, at 180 n.15.
306
307
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wall of silence” may weaken general deterrence of police misconduct,
insurers may just as well oppose the policy as support it. That is, even
if the “blue wall” may reduce expected liability in any particular case, it
may increase expected liability in the aggregate by emboldening officers
to break the rules. For obvious reasons, this cuts against insurers’ longterm business objectives.
Finally, there is the study I mentioned at the beginning of this
Section. As part of a larger project about how municipalities internalize
the law, Charles Epp collected data in 2000-2001 on numerous
organizational and environmental characteristics, including insurance
coverage, for 838 police departments drawn from a stratified random
sample of American cities. 314 He predicted, as I would have, that
“departments covered by liability insurance are likely to be more
attentive to the threats of legal liability than departments that are selfinsured” because “[i]nsurance companies are known to press their
organizational clients to adopt policies aimed at reducing their exposure
to legal liability.”315 His results, however, showed just the opposite.
Epp found that departments were less likely to adopt a host of best
practices related to the use of force if they carried liability insurance.316
They were also less likely to take extensive corrective actions against
offending officers.317 These findings, Epp noted, “support the common
claim[] … that liability insurance blunts the impact of liability
pressure.”318
I am not sure what lessons to draw from Epp’s findings. Though
they concern me, I am disinclined to generalize them too broadly. As an
initial matter, Epp did not test the relationship of interest here,
between liability insurance and the rate of police misconduct. He tested
the relationship between insurance, on the one hand, and best practices
and corrective actions, on the other hand—the latter of which might be
a proxy for misconduct. The associations he found, moreover, were
neither substantively large nor statistically significant at the
conventional level.319 Even if they had been, they would not necessarily
EPP, supra note 10, at 116-17.
Id. at 241-42.
316 Id. at 134. Epp used the term “legalized accountability” for what I’m calling
“best practices.” Id. at 117-29.
317 Id. at 134-35.
318 Id. at 134.
319 See id. at 247, 249. Epp’s survey question about insurance coverage also
may have created some noise. Epp asked municipalities whether they “purchase[d]
insurance coverage for matters related to police liability.” Email from Charles R.
Epp to Author (Nov 23, 2015, 4:22 PM CST). While the question may seem
straightforward, it’s less so than it first appears. First, given that coverage
through a pool is not technically “insurance,” see supra 79 and accompanying text,
314
315
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hold today, some fifteen years later. 320 Nor were the relationships
causal—it may be that the municipalities that experienced high rates of
misconduct felt more justified in purchasing insurance.321 Epp himself
warns that his results “are not necessarily the final word on the
influence of liability insurance,” and notes that other work “has
persuasively argued that insurance companies” in the 1980s “placed
pressure on police departments to improve their systems of control over
officers’ use of force.”322
There is a sense among policing scholars that we actually know a
good deal about how to reduce at least certain strains of police
misconduct.
The problem, many have claimed, is getting police
agencies to seize upon what we know. Insurers appear to me to be well
positioned to do just this, although more work is required before
concluding that they’re having the desired effect.
B. The Risk of Overregulation
Insurers have potential as surrogate regulators of the police partly
because their preferences substantially align with the public’s: less
misconduct is generally a good thing. But upon closer inspection, as I
alluded to earlier, we might become concerned about the places where
insurer and social preferences diverge. An insurer providing police
it’s not clear how municipalities that belonged to pools would answer this question;
at the least, it’s not clear that all would answer “yes.” Second, based on my
discussions with industry participants, it is not clear to me that all municipalities
that carry a large self-insured retention would answer the same way. Some might
respond in the negative because, for practical purposes—given that their insurance
rarely if ever kicks in—they think of themselves as self-insured. As a point of
reference, some experts consider a municipality that carries a $250,000 selfinsured retention to be “self-insured”; others set the bar much higher or take the
position that only a municipality that purchases absolutely no liability coverage of
any kind can rightly assume this label. See Schwartz, How Governments Pay,
supra note 10, at 12 n.49 (describing disagreement among experts).
320 Epp found that the prevalence of best practices correlated positively with
agency size up to a point, but then turned negative for “very large” agencies. EPP,
supra note 10, at 134, 247. When Epp conducted his survey, roughly half of these
very large agencies purchased insurance. Email from Charles R. Epp to Author
(Nov 23, 2015, 3:10 PM CST). Today, as far as I can tell, nearly all of them selfinsure. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. As a result, it is unclear
whether and to what extent the negative relationship between insurance and best
practices persists.
321 See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
116-18 (2012) (explaining that consumers tend to treat insurance as a short-term
investment and often cancel coverage if no loss is suffered).
322 EPP, supra note 10, at 134 (citing McCoy, supra note 174).
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liability coverage is doing something close to optimizing the
municipality’s level of liability—it wants the municipality to take all,
but only, cost-justified measures to reduce liability. The concern that
insurers may underregulate has run throughout the Article. Indeed,
what motivates the entire examination of insurers’ regulation is the
fear that, if insurers indemnify without regulating sufficiently, moral
hazard will increase police misconduct. In response, I have given
reason to believe that some insurers, at least, seem to take loss
prevention seriously. But perhaps more important, I have shown that
insurers have influence over the police, such that, if they do regulate
too loosely, we might tighten the screws on the insurers as a way of
putting pressure on the police.
But what about the opposite concern—that insurers may
overregulate the police? After all, an insurer does not internalize the
benefits of aggressive—and risky—crime fighting; or, equivalently, the
insurer does not internalize the cost of arrests and prosecutions
foregone by a police force suffocated by private regulation.323 Imagine a
loss-prevention measure that costs $X and averts $Y of liability, but
also reduces crime-fighting benefits by $Z. The insurer will consider
the measure to be cost-justified if X<Y; for the municipality, though, the
question instead is whether X+Z<Y.
There are at least two responses. First, although it is theoretically
possible that loss prevention hampers police work, I have not seen data
that substantiate this fear.324 It is also possible that loss prevention
facilitates more and better police work by reducing the incidence of
costly and inconvenient lawsuits that distract from the agency’s core
mission. Second, assuming sufficient competition, the market should
sort out the overregulation problem. This may be why we do not see
insurers trying to disarm the police, for example. Simply put, a
municipality that wants its police to take more risks than its insurer

See Armacost, supra note 241, at 475 (discussing the “perceived gains of
aggressive policing”).
324 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996) (finding substantial methodological flaws in many older
studies purporting to show that Miranda hamstrings law enforcement, but
conceding, after reporting results of new original research, that Miranda does
create social costs, such as increasing the likelihood that suspects will not
cooperate and lowering the conviction rate slightly). But see Paul G. Cassell & Bret
S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of
Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996) (critiquing Leo’s study and arguing that
Miranda depresses the confession rate more than Leo finds).
323
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will allow will, buoyed by public support for crime control, find a more
lenient insurer and pay higher premiums.325
If we dig any deeper, we quickly arrive at deep-seated conflicts
about constitutional theory. One who takes a classical, deontological
view of constitutional law would, I presume, urge municipalities to take
all practicable measures to reduce the risk of harm from police activity,
regardless of cost. The deontologist, that is, would worry that insurers
don’t go far enough, and would not worry about so-called
overregulation. A consequentialist, however, may have the opposite
concern—that insurers go too far, and may prohibit some socially
beneficial police activities, because they do not internalize the benefits
of successful law enforcement.326
Obviously my aim is not to persuade readers to choose one side in
this philosophical debate. The most I can say is that, in the roughest
possible sense, we might think of the path insurers take as a
compromise between these two competing theories. We may get a little
more regulation than consequentialists want and a little less than
would please the deontologists. This may be the best we can do in a
regime in which the Constitution does not specify the theory according
to which it should be implemented.327
C. Democratic Accountability
In his canonical work Suing Government, Peter Schuck argues for
expanded governmental liability to deter official wrongdoing.
Confronting the question of implementation, Schuck imagines a system
in which the government is required to indemnify or insure officials for
liability-related costs they incur.328 It takes Schuck only one paragraph
to dismiss the possibility. “[I]nsurance contracts and indemnification
laws,” Schuck predicted, “would, unless proscribed by statute,
inevitably contain certain limitations upon coverage.” 329
These
limitations would leave many official defendants judgment-proof,
shortchanging plaintiffs and undermining deterrence. 330 Moreover,
See Cohen, supra note 17, at 343-44 (citing Mayers & Smith, supra note 47,
at 288) (making the point for legal and corporate liability insurers).
326 See Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U.L. REV. 673
(2015) (arguing that, in the modern administrative state, unlike in classical
constitutional theory, the abuse of state power is something to be optimized rather
than strictly minimized).
327 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How To Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 535 (1999).
328 SCHUCK, supra note 32, at 109-10.
329 Id. at 110.
330 Id.
325
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Schuck observed, writing in 1983, “municipalities apparently
experienced serious difficulties in obtaining insurance coverage for
official liability even before the recent expansion of liability.”331 Selfinsurance, therefore, would likely be the only option. And finally,
“insurers that underwrite risks of liability for official misconduct would
presumably insist upon some influence over the agency policy and
personnel decisions that affect the magnitude of those risks, a private
interference with public administration that would surely be politically
and morally, even if not legally, objectionable.”332
Schuck’s first two objections are pragmatic, and the passage of time
has borne out neither. Neither insurance contracts nor indemnification
laws contain many meaningful exclusions; both provide coverage in all
but the most aberrant cases. 333 And the hardening market during
which Schuck wrote eventually did soften; most municipalities are able
to purchase insurance if they want it. This leaves us with Schuck’s
third, normative objection. Schuck correctly predicted that municipal
liability insurers would typically insist on, or at least attempt to gain,
influence over policy and personnel decisions that affect the risks they
insure. Tolerating the role that insurers play, therefore, requires
responding to Schuck’s claim that such influence is “politically and
morally” objectionable.
Unfortunately, Schuck does not elaborate on his opposition, so its
precise nature remains unclear. I suspect that there is really one
objection, not two—i.e., the “political” and “moral” objections are one
and the same—and that it stems from a concern about undue private
influence over public administration.
Whither democratic
accountability, I imagine Schuck saying, when unelected and profitdriven insurers call the shots?
If I have Schuck right, at least two significant flaws undermine his
position. First, in objecting to private influence here, Schuck seems to
assume a highly idealized model of governance in which public actors
have total control over public administration. In reality, however—
perhaps more today than when Schuck wrote, to be fair—the
government constantly solicits “influence” from private industry. 334
Unless Schuck is prepared to do away with all of these arrangements,
he needs some theory about why private influence is especially
objectionable here, which he does not provide. Second, the people—
Id.
Id.
333 On insurance contracts, see supra note 171 and accompanying text.
On
indemnification laws, see Schwartz, supra note 30, at 890.
334 See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan, Mayor de Blasio’s Hired Guns: Private
Consultants Help Shape City Hall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2015.
331
332
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through their democratically elected representatives and officials
appointed by those representatives—chose to retain this outside help,
with all that the help entails.335 That is, the people chose to trade some
degree of governmental autonomy in exchange for what they hoped
would be lower liability costs and protection from catastrophic risk. A
populace with different preferences would make a different choice—a
stronger preference for autonomy pushes toward self-insurance or, at
the least, more expensive coverage from an insurer with a more lenient
loss-prevention program.336 At the opposite end of the spectrum, some
municipalities, fearing liability exposure, have abolished their police
agencies altogether and contracted with third parties to provide
policing. 337
It is not clear how it would enhance democratic
accountability to prohibit the electorate from choosing which option it
prefers.
There is an additional concern about democratic accountability,
however, which is that insurance may dampen feedback from the
liability system that is crucial to the public’s efforts to monitor their
representatives. Putting insurance aside, even a large tort judgment
will not deter an individual officer from wrongdoing, goes a common
refrain, because the municipality that employs him will indemnify
him.338 And the municipality is similarly undeterred because it simply
spreads the cost of the judgment among its many taxpayers. If civil
liability is to deter, the taxpayers must convert these monetary costs
into political ones, punishing the responsible officials at the ballot box

Effective loss prevention may require some authority over the insured: “A
purveyor of loss prevention services must be able to say no to his client, which
requires some degree of independence from the client.” Cohen, supra note 17, at
343.
336 Although self-insurance is most common among the largest jurisdictions,
some small and mid-sized jurisdictions self-insure as well. Schwartz, How
Governments Pay, supra note 10, at 13 n.53, 16.
337 See, e.g., Community Policing and Contract Cities, PINELLAS CTY. SHERIFF’S
OFFICE,
http://www.pcsoweb.com/community-policing-and-contract-cities
(last
visited Nov. 24, 2015) (“Thirteen cities in Pinellas County contract with the
Sheriff’s Office for primary law enforcement services.”); Bill Oram, Durham: Call a
Cop, Tualatin Wants All Our Money, OREGONIAN (Jan 20. 2009, 7:42 AM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/tualatin/index.ssf/2010/01/
durham_call_a_cop_tualatin_wants_all_our_money.html (“Durham does not have
its own police department. For 20 years, Durham has paid a flat rate [for] police
work provided by Tualatin cops.”).
338 See, e.g., Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights
Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and
a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587 (2000).
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(if punishment they deserve).339 Insurance, we might fear, disrupts this
mechanism of democratic accountability by spreading the costs of
constitutional liability even further, across the entire pool of insureds
and all of their taxpayers, until they are essentially imperceptible.
The objection is ultimately an empirical one. The possibility that
insurance spreads the risk of police wrongdoing so broadly as to relieve
the polity of any felt responsibility for the costs of that wrongdoing
deserves further thought. In truth, I am skeptical that the additional
loss-spreading from insurance—beyond that the tax base already
provides—really makes a difference. But even assuming it does, there
are nevertheless several reasons to think that, in the end, insurance
more likely enhances democratic accountability than depletes it.
First, many who believe that lawsuits deter police misconduct point
to reputational harms as the key. It seems unlikely that the financing
mechanism through which judgments are ultimately satisfied reduces
the reputational costs to the responsible officers; the superiors who
hired, trained, and managed them; or the politicians who appointed
those superiors.
Second, taxpayers who are unaware of the
municipality’s insurance arrangement will continue to believe that they
are materially affected by adverse judgments. This describes most
taxpayers, in all likelihood—the media only occasionally discusses
liability insurance when reporting on payouts attributable to police
misconduct.340
Third, in many jurisdictions, lawsuits challenging police conduct are
actually quite rare—major lawsuits are low-probability, highconsequence events. 341 Well-known behavioral biases may lead the
electorate, and the policymakers they have elected, to discount the risk
of liability too much, essentially down to zero.342 By converting these
large but improbable liabilities into insurance premiums, insurance
may help to “bring home” the risk of police misconduct, making it
harder to ignore.343 Insurance forces municipalities to pay for risky
339 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Sturgess, 222 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1911) (explaining
that municipal liability is “calculated to stimulate the exertions of the indifferent
and the law-abiding to avoid the falling of a burden which they must share with
the lawless”).
340 See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious
Case of the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 769 (2004) (“A good number
of stories mention payments to be made by the city, but only a few offer details
about the relevant budget lines or insurance policies that cover the payments to
plaintiffs.”).
341 See sources cited infra note 366.
342 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 21-24 (2007).
343 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 199-200. Of course, insurers can
also fall prey to behavioral biases that lead to irrational discounting. See, e.g.,
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police activities regardless whether those activities happen to cause
harm, which often depends on “the fortuities of chance” rather than any
moral consideration.344 Put slightly differently, insurance premiums, if
priced correctly, tell policymakers about the likelihood of suit. This
should facilitate political oversight of the police. Publicizing premiums,
and making them readily comparable to the premiums paid by similar
jurisdictions, would facilitate democratic accountability as well.345 And
if their signals are ignored, insurers can convert rising liability risk into
actionable events—for instance, by threatening to drop coverage unless
reforms are made.346
D. Law’s Content
I argued above that insurers construe the law while implementing
it—while translating judicial opinions, for example, into workable rules
for daily life—and in that sense influence what police officers
understand the law to be. I now wish to take a step back and consider
how insurers, and the institution of insurance, affect the content of
those judicial opinions—that is, how they affect the substance of
criminal procedure law at a more abstract level, before they help
translate it into practice.
What I have in mind is Marc Galanter’s classic typology of litigants.
Galanter divided the world into “one-shotters” and “repeat players.”347
Civil rights plaintiffs who sue the police are one-shotters in Galanter’s
argot. The municipal interests they sue are repeat players. The
insurers that defend the officers and municipalities, then, we might call
“super-repeat-players,” in that they each represent a large number of
municipalities, each of which itself is a repeat player. Galanter’s
insight was that one-shotters and repeat players “play the litigation
game differently,” such that “we would expect the body of ‘precedent’
cases … to be relatively skewed toward those favorable to” the repeat
Howard C. Kunreuther & Mark V. Pauly, Behavioral Economics and Insurance:
Principles and Solutions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
INSURANCE LAW 15, 21-23 (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015).
344 See Schwartz, supra note 11, at 323-24 (describing this “ethical appeal” of
tort liability insurance).
345 Cf. BAKER & GRIFFITH, supra note 15, at 202-20.
346 See, e.g., Letter from Ann Gergen, President, Ariz. Mun. Risk Retention
Pool, to Laura Bruno, Interim Town Manager, Town of Quartzsite (Oct. 5, 2012)
(on file with author).
347 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); see also Catherine Albiston,
The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1999).
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player.348 A one-shotter, for example, will attempt to maximize the
outcome in his single case. A repeat player, in contrast, cares about its
entire set of cases, and thus can “play for rules” that will favorably
influence the outcomes of future disputes.349 We would therefore expect
repeat players to settle “bad” cases and litigate “good” ones.350 That
judges may prioritize the interests of “the more organized, attentive and
influential of their constituents,” which tend to be repeat players,
augments these strategic advantages.351
Supposing that Galanter is right—and I tend to think he is—what
rules do insurers play for? It is tempting to think that they would favor
the restriction of liability exposure, which would minimize payouts
under the policies they write. But, of course, a world without liability
exposure is no place for a liability insurer! Liability insurers need the
threat of liability—substantial liability, really—to stay in business.
And their business, some think, actually tends to exert an expansionary
force on liability rules. For a variety of reasons, that is, liability
insurance does not simply respond to liability; “liability insurance
promotes liability.” 352 This effect may be socially beneficial in the
policing context to the extent that liability insurers are better than
first-party insurers—like health, disability, and life insurers—at
regulating policing risks.353 They almost certainly are.
What insurers care about most is not that liability exposure is
limited, but that it’s predictable. As Kenneth Abraham explains,
“[i]nsurance operates most comfortably with stochastic events, in which
the probability of the frequency and magnitude of insured losses that
348 Galanter, supra note 347, at 98, 102. Galanter goes on to argue that, while
the plaintiffs’ bar helps even the playing field somewhat, “this is short of
overcoming the fundamental strategic advantages” of the repeat players. Id. at
118.
349 Id. at 100.
350 See id. at 100-03; see also Miller & Wright, supra note 340, at 773-74
(making a similar argument in the policing context).
351 Galanter, supra note 347, at 122; see also Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary
and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355 (1999); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest
Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 66–87
(1991).
352 Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1629, 1634 (1994); see Bovbjerg, supra note 11, at 1678 (arguing that Syverud’s
thesis “seems generally correct, though … exaggerate[d]”); Steven W. Pottier &
Robert C. Witt, On the Demand for Liability Insurance: An Insurance Economics
Perspective, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1681 (1994) (calling Syverud’s argument “that liability
insurance promotes liability … basically reasonable in the long run”); see also
ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 224-26; Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Insurance
Market, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1991, at 134.
353 Cf. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 14, at 217-19.
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will be suffered by a group of policyholders is highly predictable.”354
“When faced with excessive uncertainty regarding these probabilities,”
Abraham continues, “an insurer may be as risk averse as individual
policyholders because it cannot estimate its probable success in
diversifying risk through pooling, and because it cannot determine the
correct price to charge for its risk-bearing services.”355
From this we can identify two characteristics that insurers should
want the law to possess. First, insurers benefit from legal principles
that are clear. Whether good or bad for their policyholders, if a legal
principle is clear, insurers are better able to price its effect. We might,
on this rationale, expect insurers to urge courts to choose rules over
standards.356 Second, insurers want the law to be nonretroactive. As
one commentator put it, insurers “vehemently object to unpredictable
change.” 357 They have strong incentives to prevent unforeseeable
payouts that were not priced into the premiums they previously
collected. Constitutional tort law, proceeding as it does in a common
law fashion, poses a problem for insurers, then, because common law
decisions were (and are) presumptively retroactive. 358 We should
therefore expect insurers to be proponents of doctrines that limit the
effects of “new law” in the criminal justice system, including qualified
immunity and nonretroactivity, and to favor a broad definition of what
law is “new.” 359 In fact, to the extent we believe police liability
insurance to be socially beneficial, the desire to ensure that policing
risks remain insurable (at reasonable cost) supplies a potential novel
justification for these beleaguered judicial doctrines.

Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 946-47 (1988).
355 Id. at 947; see Robert Kneuper & Bruce Yandle, Auto Insurers and the Air
Bag, 61 J. RISK & INS. 107 (1994) (describing how auto insurers lobbied for air bags
because they protect against the types of injuries that result in the most
unpredictable damage awards).
356 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 608 (1992) (concluding that rules “will tend to provide clearer notice
than standards to individuals at the time they decide how to act”).
357 Bovbjerg, supra note 11, at 1668.
358 See, e.g., John Bernard Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court
Doctrine “As Applied”, 61 N.C. L. REV. 745, 746 (1983).
359 See Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L.
REV. 1, 38 (2002) (reviewing the law of qualified immunity and nonretroactivity
and explaining how both concern “the novelty of the law being made”); see also
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990) (defining as “new” any rule the
correctness of which was “susceptible to debate among reasonable minds”).
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E. The Role of Insurance Law
Finally, what role might law play in regulating the market for police
liability insurance?
How might we regulate police, that is, by
regulating their insurers? Consider three examples. First, fear of
incurring tort liability—for negligently undertaking to provide riskreduction services—may affect the way in which some insurers are
willing to regulate the police.360 One insurer I interviewed, for example,
expressed reluctance to advise police agencies on personnel matters for
fear of exposure under employment-related laws. 361 Creating safe
harbors from liability—targeted toward these pockets of activity—
might free insurers to regulate more closely.362
Second, market insurance struggles to regulate effectively its most
diminutive customers—what one insurer called “commodity clients.”363
These small municipalities are abundant—the United States is a
“country of small towns,” as another insurer put it.364 And they pose a
number of challenges for insurers’ loss-prevention programs. Because
the premiums these municipalities pay are relatively small, it is often
infeasible for insurers to discount rates enough to compensate for the
expenses of loss prevention. Nor is it cost-effective for insurers to
individualize loss prevention or engage in the monitoring necessary to
link premiums to care.365 If claims are infrequent, moreover, there may
be no “substantial base of losses” from which insurers can experiencerate their policies in a statistically valid way.366
360 See, e.g., John Dwight Ingraham, Liability of Insurers for Negligent
Inspection of Insured Premises, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 623 (2002); Peter H. Schuck, Tort
Liability to Those Injured by Negligent Accreditation Decisions, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (1994).
361 Telephone Interview with Risk Pool C, supra note 101.
362 See Kyle D. Logue, Encouraging Insurers To Regulate: The Role (If Any) for
Tort Law (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No.
15-001, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2547358.
363 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 88.
364 Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer F, supra note 34; see, e.g.,
CRESSWELL & LANDON-MURRAY, supra note 100, at x (stating that 82% of New York
municipalities have fewer than 10,000 residents).
365 See HEIMER, supra note 93, at 203-05; Baker & Swedloff, supra note 54, at
1446; Schwartz, supra note 11, at 357.
366 See ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 231; SUGARMAN, supra note 24, at 14
(noting that the firms most amenable to experience rating tend to self-insure);
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 61 (describing the
difficulty of insuring small municipalities that experience no loss for long stretches,
punctuated by occasional large losses). On the infrequency of claims in some small
municipalities, see Kevin Murphy, Mich. Mun. League, Municipal Liability, in
HANDBOOK FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS—OPERATIONS 77, 77 (2004) (observing that,
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Paradoxically, then, the large municipalities for which experience
rating and loss prevention should work best, and whose police agencies
commit a disproportionate amount of misconduct, are the very
municipalities that tend to self-insure. 367 And the ones that buy
insurance present some serious practical problems for insurers. One
potential solution could be to forbid these small municipalities to
insure. Prohibiting insurance can be socially beneficial in certain
circumstances.368 Yet there are ways in which small municipalities
benefit disproportionately from insurance coverage. The lower number
of occurrences a municipality experiences, “the more pure risk [it] faces,
for the less able [it] is to pool or average out risks within [its] own
operations.”369 A small municipality may also have less experience, and
therefore greater difficulty, monitoring defense counsel’s service. 370
And, of course, a smaller tax base makes it harder to absorb the shock
of a large judgment or settlement.
There are two solutions that might work better than an insurance
prohibition.
First, insurance regulators could require small
municipalities to pool their risks and resources before purchasing
coverage on the commercial market. This would make at least some
additional
loss-prevention
measures
cost-effective,
even
if
individualization may remain challenging. Second, regulators might
require small municipalities to carry a deductible or self-insured
retention, which forces them to share in all losses.371 At present, some
of pool’s 500 member entities, “[m]any of them go years without an insurance
claim”); see also David Eitle et al., The Effect of Organizational and Environmental
Factors on Police Misconduct, 17 POLICE Q. 103 (2014) (finding that 27% of
surveyed police departments had no reported incidents of misconduct during the
one-year reporting period); Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer I, supra
note 111 (asserting that many of the company’s insured municipalities had never
tendered a police liability claim).
367 See Eitle et al., supra note 366, at 112-14.
368 An entity that is not judgment-proof, but which might escape liability for
wrongdoing, will desire to purchase full liability coverage. Steven Shavell, On the
Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON
RISK & INS. 166, 176 n.32 (2000). But the level of care it will be led to take will be
lower than optimal, because its expected liability will be less than expected harm.
Id. If insurers do not link premiums to care, forbidding coverage may be the
socially desirable policy if the benefits of the entity’s enhanced incentives to take
care outweigh the costs, if any, of forcing the entity to bear the risk. See id. at 17576 & n.28.
369 Schwartz, supra note 11, at 356.
370 Id.
371 See HEIMER, supra note 93, at 205. A deductible does create some reverse
moral hazard, as the insurer has the right to defend but bears no responsibility for
costs below the deductible amount. See Avraham, supra note 40, at 73. This may
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insurers write “first-dollar” police liability policies for small
municipalities. 372 From a social perspective, “[t]his practice …
undermines the capacity of insurance to promote loss prevention,
because ordinary policyholders have so little at stake in the risk of highprobability, low-severity losses.”373 It is also a bad use of premium
dollars from the perspective of the municipality (and thus the
taxpayers), because the “primary function of insurance is to spread the
risk of losses that policyholders cannot effectively bear themselves.”374
“If insurance were restructured to include large copayments by
policyholders,” Kenneth Abraham explains, “it could simultaneously
and more effectively spread the most severe losses and help to prevent
losses from occurring.”375 Insurance regulators could consider banning
first-dollar police liability policies or requiring a substantial deductible
or retention as a regulatory default rule.
My third and final example is the most sweeping. Suppose
subsequent empirical research finds that, in the aggregate, police
liability insurance reduces police misconduct. Would we want the law
to mandate insurance for all police operations? 376 To be sure, a
mandate would override the voluntary choice some municipalities had
made to self-insure, and economic theory typically presumes that
voluntary transactions are efficient. Here, however, to the extent that
self-insurance controls police misconduct poorly compared to market
insurance, self-insurance imposes costly externalities on the rest of
society, which market insurance would reduce.
A market-insurance mandate may introduce new costs as well. For
instance, a self-insured municipality forced to buy insurance on the
market might have concerns about the quality of service the insurer
would provide, the lack of municipal control, and monitoring and
contracting costs.377 Nor can we be certain that the benefits that (by
hypothesis) flow from voluntary insurance transactions would remain if
be part of why many municipalities seem to choose a self-insured retention instead
of a deductible—with a self-insured retention, the municipality retains control over
litigation defense until the retention is exhausted.
372 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
373 ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 237.
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 If police liability insurance increases the amount of police misconduct, we
would want to determine why, and then design regulation to neutralize the
pathology. Barring that, we might consider restricting the availability of insurance
coverage or eliminating it altogether.
377 See John Hood & Peter C. Young, The Risk Management Implications of
Outsourcing Claims Management Services in Local Government, 5 RISK MGMT., no.
3, 2003, at 7.
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those transactions were compelled by law; a forced relationship may be
less productive than a voluntary one.
These hurdles are not
insurmountable, though. One potential accommodation would be a “soft
mandate” that requires the purchase of market insurance or proof of an
adequate in-house loss-prevention program.
If future empirical research about the effects of liability insurance
on police misconduct is favorable, an insurance mandate should at least
be on the table among the possible policy responses. I should caution,
though, that even mandatory insurance would leave regulatory gaps.
Regulation-by-insurance, it turns out, may work better or worse
depending on the type of police misconduct being managed. Certain
kinds of misconduct, like racial profiling, are largely resistant to
regulation-by-insurance, and others, like the sorts of bad acts that lead
to wrongful convictions, require tweaks to the regulatory mechanism. I
tackle this complication separately in related work.378
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article is a first attempt to map the universe of police liability
insurance. That this territory has gone uncharted for so long reflects,
perhaps, a “big city bias” that has focused scholarly attention on the
minority of municipalities that self-insure. Not only has this led to an
incomplete theoretical model of policing, but also it has overlooked what
may be a powerful institutional ally in efforts to reduce police
misconduct in municipalities both large and small.
Additional research might fill in details my first pass has omitted,
or pick up where I have left off. How, for example, do insurers affect
the litigation and settlement of police misconduct claims? How does
insurance for state and federal law enforcement compare to municipallevel insurance?
Can we quantify the effects of police liability
insurance on police misconduct? Through the opposing forces of risk
management and moral hazard, insurance has the potential to make
police behavior either better or worse. The likelihood that it has no
effect at all, and thus can continue to be ignored, seems vanishingly
small.
It is also unlikely that policing is the only context in which private
insurers are construing the Constitution and regulating public actors.
Public school districts, for example, purchase liability insurance.379 The

See generally Rappaport, supra note 221.
Education, LIBERTY MUTUAL INS., https://www.libertymutualgroup.com/
business-insurance/industry-insurance/school-insurance (last visited Jan. 30,
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public-school setting presents a host of constitutional issues from free
speech to due process in disciplinary proceedings. How are insurers
shaping the path of the law in that arena? Where else is their influence
felt? And what other private institutions join them in interpreting the
Constitution outside the courts?

insurance/specialized-industries/public-sector/public-schools.aspx (last visited Jan.
30, 2016).

77

